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Abstract: 
 
The following work is the result of a research to investigate the decision-making 
processes that led to the to the US invasion of Iraq. We wished to objectify the 
theories, which, themselves objectified the events of the Iraq war and claimed this as 
truth. We therefore strived to answer what the theoretical principles underlying the 
invasion were, with the use of the concept “orientalism” and what contradictions that 
were to be discovered in two very opposing sources – a conspiracy theory and an 
established governmental supportive theory. The research enlightened us with data 
that both confirmed some of our pre-assumption – the US use of force for instance – 
but also challenged us to the point where the two sources were simply too 
contradictive to form a true answer or a true theory for us. And though inconclusive, 
that was exactly what we wanted. To show the objectification and contradictions that 
makes this case both suspicious but most importantly very compelling and fascinating 
to uncover. 
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     1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Problem area 
 
With the government treated as the primary actor concerning foreign policy decision-
making, in our case concerning warfare, it raises both conflict and cooperation 
between intelligent rational decision-makers. These decisions will affect the whole 
society in the long run, with both costs of war (e.g. decreased or not optimal welfare 
spendings and harms to the market) and benefits of war (e.g. cultural imperialism and 
pay-offs/utilizations, such as new markets and resources.).  
How warfare decisions are presented is therefore important to our understanding of 
war. We have chosen to study the governmental decision-making of the United States 
including an orientalist view of warfare with a case study of the Iraq war.  
We strive to end up with our own theory on why the United States went in to Iraq. 
What where the motives, how where these presented by the government and with 
what reactions? 
In order to find an answer to our problem formulation through our own theory, we 
will - of course - work inductively. This we will do by comparing two counterparts, in 
our case this will be; the government’s public stimulus on why The United States 
should enter Iraq, versus a conspiracy theory created by Noam Chomsky in his book 
“Hegemony of Survival” (N. Chomsky, 2003), in which he critically discusses the 
“real” stimulus for The United States to make the Iraq intervention.  
Furthermore we will apply these two counterparts with theories that will encourage 
our work towards ending up with creating our own theory on why The United States 
went in to Iraq. These theories will be theories that are working with the international 
human interactionism: Orientalism (Said, 1978) and The Clash of Civilizations 
(Huntington, 1996).  
Orientalism (Said, 1978) is a work on how the western predetermined assumptions of 
the orient, and how it led to cultural misrepresentation. And The Clash of Civilization 
(Huntington, 1996) is a book on Huntington’s theory on how the different 
civilizations are creating international discords, because of the lack of understanding 
between the different civilizations e.g. the case we are working on, concerning the 
discords that are occurring with the western civilization versus the Northeast-African 
civilization.  
These theories will help us get an understanding of some of the driving forces behind 
the Iraq intervention, the lack of knowledge about one another, and the lack of mutual 
understanding between the different civilizations and cultures. 
Making an analysis of: a conspiracy theory on one side and a political correct decision 
on the other side. What could be taken from both the political and the conspiracy 
theory in order to clarify the event? 
 
1.2 Motivation 
 
Based on the outlined problem area we engaged in the discussion of how we wanted 
our project to turn out.  
In the beginning we had different opinions on how we wanted to approach our project 
for this second semester. We initiated a brainstorm for this project, and rapidly came 
to the conclusion that we wanted to do something new. We were all tired of the 
trivialities that are often met when facing these kinds of projects. Therefore we 
initiated a research on how we could approach this problem area – the process of 
decision-making, and the driving forces behind the Iraq intervention – in a new 
innovative way. We therefore came to the conclusion that we wanted to create 
something with this project, a theory. Through analyzing two opposite views on the 
case (Iraq intervention), we are able to create something new and innovative. That, 
maybe, could contribute to others studying the process of decision-making, primarily 
concerning international warfare, with a starting point from the case of the Iraq 
intervention. 
Besides our motivation for the approach of our project, we thought that this case, the 
Iraq intervention, was particularly interesting because we interpret it as a public secret 
that the reasons for the Iraq intervention always has been suspicious. At least as we 
see it. We are aware that we face the research with presumptions and that it will of 
course effect the reflexive function of writing. We are not in any way hiding our 
curiosity, ethnography or personal beliefs and we do not have a prefixed hypothesis. 
We do however strive towards a theory that has handled every source with respect to 
its status. Our pre-assumptions are not to deny, but the whole purpose of the research 
is to question – to question those theories that claims itself as truth. We do not expect 
- nor hope – to come to any conclusions anymore true than those we study. We expect 
the contradictions to highlight the complexity of the case and the differing “answers” 
to shed light on the opinion diversity. That is our real goal. The ontology and 
epistemology is of course important to clarify to reach the closest we can to a 
“scientific truth” that has handled the sources with care. This will be dealt with in the 
methods section. 
 
The new kind of armed interventions in contemporary politics, roused our interest 
because of the massive, both economic and cultural consequences for the involved 
states, and the rest of the world. 
Summed up; our motivation behind this project is that we have the liberty to create a 
new kind of theory, on a contemporary case, based on two counterparts with opposing 
theories. And then find the vanishing point, which we will fulfill with our theory.  
 
1.3 Problem Formulation 
 
What kind of theoretical building blocks were assembled in order to legislate the 
invasion of Iraq? 
1.4 Working Questions 
 
Our working questions are outlined beneath. They are, together with the problem 
formulation, the foundation of our project. They are our basis in almost every part of 
the project. 
 
Working questions: 
 - What were the processes behind the decision-making of the US intervention in 
Iraq? 
 - What were PNAC and Noam Chomsky’s arguments for and against intervention? 
 - What motives, if any, could have existed beyond those publicly announced, and 
who could have benefited from these? 
 - What contradictions exist in our empirical material and how can these highlight our 
problem? 
 
     2. Contextualizing of the Iraq war: 
 
When Bush was elected to president in 2001, the chances of an invasion in Iraq grew 
a lot, because of his neo-conservative political viewpoints. When being possessed 
with the power as a president, George W. Bush immediately accused Iraq of 
developing Weapons of Mass Destruction (http://www.thefinertimes.com/War-in-
The-Middle-East/iraq-war-summary.html), and along with other American senior 
officials he insinuated that Saddam Hussein, the – at the time – leader of Iraq, had 
direct ties to the Al Qaeda 
(http://www.nytimes.com/ref/timestopics/topics_iraq.html). The accusation of Iraq 
being in possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction, arguably originates in that Iraq, 
and Saddam Hussein, has refused to give the UN weapon inspectors access to Iraq 
since the first Gulf war in 1990. 
 
Even though that there was an arguable reason for the intervention since the war was 
first initiated, there has been a lot of doubt concerning the reasons for “why the 
United States intervened in Iraq”. The official statement is that there were solid 
reasons to believe that Iraq was in possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction. But 
these weapons have never been found. There has since been created a lot of 
conspiratorial theories, with different allegations towards the neo-conservative foreign 
policy, which was being executed by the Bush government. These allegations have 
evolved to be more convincing, as the Weapons of Mass Destruction has never been 
found. 
 
This is our primary focus in our project, and why we chose this particular case. The 
many opposing theories on why the United States intervened in Iraq. And all of these 
opposing theories have, inevitably, created a great doubt concerning the intentions of 
the intervention. – And this is what triggered us - the clear disruption concerning the 
“real” motives behind the intervention. 
 
 
     3. Methods: 
 
3.1 Approach:  
 
The following section will contain both why we chose to work inductively and also 
why we chose not to work deductively in the end as we believe it will shed light on 
why the decision of an inductive approach was made along with a clear explanation of 
our motivations.  
            
We are working interdisciplinary with knowledge, theory and methods from political 
science and sociology. Both disciplines has contributed to a completion and 
understanding of various objectives such as covering the research questions from the 
most suitable angles. Our choice of empirical material was very reliant on the 
interdisciplinary of the project. By combining the two disciplines it allows us to 
embrace the problem from both angles. We will be able to discover the political 
strategies, which go side by side with the sociological strategies.  
 
The project was initiated with a deductive approach to our research question where 
we would, with relevant theory develop a hypothesis and through observation and 
analysis of the case of the Iraq War either confirm or deny it. However, our problem 
area – basically described as the study of conflicting warfare decision-making 
processes – was most certainly relevant for a comparative analysis strategy. This was 
very early derived from our research questions, where it was clear that they were 
answered best with use of more than just one set of theoretical/empirical material. It 
should be clear that a comparative analysis approach is not in itself a limitation to a 
deductive approach. Nonetheless we find deductive reasoning to limit the authority of 
our study (Flick, 2009, p. 422) It should briefly be mentioned already that (with 
inductive reasoning) each of our two empirical sources will function as our theoretical 
foundation. With deduction however, we would then start with a theory, which would 
lay function as framework for our analysis of the empirical material on the basis of 
hypothesis. A deductive approach is now already conflicting with our motivation for a 
research that does not produce any number of hypotheses early in the process nor is 
derived from a pre-existing theory. That would force us to choose a theory, for 
instance Noam Chomsky’s anti-governmental theory upon the US warfare and create 
a hypothesis on that ground. Our observations and research would then finally lead to 
a conclusion – a confirmation or denial on that theory. But we have acknowledged 
that a majority of sources dealing with the war are wildly biased. And we do not see 
that as a limitation. At least not working inductively.  
 
An inductive approach would allow us to, in a higher degree, find certain matching 
patterns – and of course contradictions and opposing declarations - in the two cases 
through observation and reading of our empirical material. Our project would then, 
instead of starting from an already existing theory, lead to the development of our 
own theory based on the specific sources and materials linked to the Iraq war that we 
use. And that should be clear. It is a broader generalization we end up with as an end 
product, but not a theory that will reach as far to be implemented in other cases, and 
maybe not even with another set of sources. We approach an immensely wide 
selection of empirical material to describe a relatively narrow field of history. We do 
not have the time or resources to elaborate each and every aspect. But we still believe 
that it is possible for us to reach a theory that has valued each source equally and 
found the most truthful result, at least in the sense of these two sources. But it will 
never be unfalsifiable, as the range of possible arguments, which are possible to find, 
can always prove our theory to be false. That is the basic problem of induction and we 
are aware of that. Limiting the theory to our  limited set of empirical material is the 
only way to avoid a too broad generalization. 
 
In our project, the research questions furthermore had a great impact on our choice of 
qualitative data to the extent of what literature that would fit the explanation of our 
research questions best. We have therefore decided to work inductively as we develop 
our own theory from two different theories (our literature chosen from our research 
questions). We are not interested in testing or confirming a theory, but to develop one. 
In order to do that, we will have to neatly analyze our main theories and empirical 
material and their epistemology.  
 
 
 
3.2 E. Said and post-structuralism 
 
Edward Said’s work of Orientalism has a significant role in our project. It has shaped 
our approach to both of our empirical sources, which will finally be analyzed in 
respect to and with epistemological principles regarding Orientalism. As we are 
adopting E. Said’s concepts regarding objectification etc. we are thereby also 
adopting his epistemology. We are however performing a constant epistemological 
surveillance. The whole idea of the project is to reveal how limited our empirical 
material, functioning as theories, really are. What do they presume and suppose, and 
how does such contradictions appear when both come across, and claims itself, as a 
truthful theory? Our motive with the research is, as before mentioned, not to create a 
universal truthful theory. We are working meta-theoretically and monitoring of our 
epistemology is therefore important in order for us not to claim our theory as truth and 
make that, as we see it, mistake our theoreticists made by claiming their theory true. 
We do not present our findings as universally applicable. Nor do we present our 
findings as an objective representation of the Iraq war. We post-structurally believe 
that texts result from the interests of those who produce the text (Flick, 2009, p. 63) 
We believe that problematizing scientifically acknowledged theories gives us a 
scientific legitimacy in that we can rectify and take a logical step beyond the existing 
theories and then come up with own theoretical perspective. Completely objective 
hermeneutics are not possible with Said’s role in the project and our own pre-
assumptions and intentions.  
In order to present our method and approach to embrace our empirical material, there 
is below illustrated the basic skeleton of the triangle of our theoretical vanishing 
point. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pyramid of approach and usage of the empirical and theoretical material. 
 
This illustration shows our empirical material (black) and theoretical framework 
(white) and their relation to each other. As our analytical vanishing point, Orientalism 
stays on top of the pyramid and is the primary foundation for the final analysis of our 
empirical material. We will show how the concept of orientalism became the political 
guidelines for intervention, genocide etc. Every theoretical addition, not limited to 
Clash of Civilizations, fills the core of the pyramid, which is useful for highlighting 
other interesting perspectives to the study apart from Said’s concepts. It will however 
never have the same status of Orientalism in our project as it will be the very 
vanishing point of the analysis. Concluding: We will metatheoretically falsify or 
confirm our two opposing sides of empirical material with Orientalism by E. Said as 
the analytical vanishing point along with additional theory (blue) by S. Huntington 
inter alia.  We thereby wish to rectify and take a logical step beyond the existing 
theories and as a result come up with own theoretical perspective. 
 
 
Edward.  W. Said ‐ Orientalism (1978)  
N. Chomsky  ‐ Hegemony or Survival (2003)  PNAC – Iraq: Setting the record straight 
Samuel P. Huntington – the Clash of Civilizations (1996)  
3.3 Constructionism  
 
Deriving directly from our epistemological standpoint comes our ontology. We have 
constructionist ontology. Orientalism describes classifications of humans. These 
divisions are generalizations, which appoint distinctions between people based on 
despicable goals. These generalizations create a polarization of reality through 
objectifications. The basic usage for us is that, through constructionist ontology, 
objectifications are made to imagine realities and through objectification of the orient 
a reality could have been build, which would lead to the intervention of Iraq. 
Constructionist ontology is a set of “epistemologies in which the social reality is seen 
as the result of constructive processes (activities of the members of processes in their 
minds).” (Flick, 2009, p. 468) We thereby also state our found knowledge and all 
knowledge, including our empirical material to be a human construct. “Experiences 
are structured and understood through concepts and contexts, which are constructed 
by this subject.” (Flick, 2009, p. 70) The constructionist ontology, the question of  
“what exists” for the individual and how the individual construct concepts is very 
important to us to describe how Iraq was portrayed and objectified/conceptualized. 
How concepts of the foreign is established, is by constructionist ontology socially 
constructed as “the terms by which we account for the world and ourselves are not 
dictated by the stipulated objects of such accounts [...] The terms and forms by which 
we achieve understanding of the world and ourselves are social artifacts, products of 
historically and culturally situated interchanges among people.”(Flick, 2009, p. 71) 
We are aware and not supposing that objective reality is a reflection of the human 
objectifications. They are “true” for the individual but not universally applicable to 
the world. We will therefore never reach a more “truthful” theory than for example 
“Hegemony or Survival” as reality for us as well is a social construct. It should also 
be taken into account that we with this project is actually objectifying the on who 
objectify in the first place (the theorists). 
 
 
 
3.4 The reflexive function of writing  
 
The reflexive function of writing is very important for our project especially with the 
use of a comparative study strategy as it forces us to extract important key points 
from, in our case, two clearly biased sourced without letting it be influenced by our 
own ethnography to the point where our own personal opinions are visible. At least to 
the point where it is clear that we have let out important parts in order to what we 
wish. ”The qualitative researcher is not an objective, authoritative, politically neutral 
observer standing outside and above the text” (Flick, 2009, p. 422). We thereby have 
to take the relationship to the reader into account and make sure that the authority of 
our work is legit. We can do this in a variety of ways. We will have to not only 
analyze both sources equally and undifferentiated, but also acknowledge that every 
source of empirical data possesses data, which will help us to answer our research 
questions and not agreeing with one or another during the analysis. However, as we 
work inductively, and thereby creating our own theory on a subject it does force us to 
weigh and evaluate the validity of both sources. And it might end up with a theory 
that uses more from one source or another.  
We could, and will, however allow the research to be influenced by our personal 
opinions to some extent, because it allows us to find and present interesting insights, 
and not end up in endless reflexive loops (Flick, 2009, p. 423). It is nevertheless the 
experiences we gain in the investigation, which shape the work we present to the 
reader. But that will again lead us to always have in mind the people we present the 
study to. We do however feel that in order to achieve a scientific legitimacy we need 
to withhold personal beliefs as far as possible. But they will at any time motivate us to 
question and progress our work with the empirical data, and theories.  
 
3.5 Data Collection: 
 
We will collect our primary sources of data from two radically opposing sources 
which is Noam Chomsky’s “Hegemony or Survival” (2003) and a governmental 
supporting theory (the Project for a New American Century’s Iraq: setting the record 
straight (2005) These two opposing theories will be our primary empirical material 
and what lays foundation for our analysis and discussion. Our material will be 
primarily qualitative data as we have decided that numbers or calculations alone 
cannot evaluate the decision-making processes. We will need to analyze actions and 
statements. Quantitative data will only be use to enforce certain statements made 
throughout the research such as polls and surveys. 
To sum up: 
1) Empirical material consisting of 2 opposing theories on the Iraq intervention 
2) Theoretical framework by primarily E. Said and secondarily S. Huntington.  
 
E. Said will be used to counter and question the Project for a New American Century 
but not used in connection to countering Chomsky. This is because Chomsky 
addresses many of the same problems that Said does, and therefore cannot be 
questioned with the use of orientalism. 
 
3.6 Limitations: 
 
Our limitations in the project design and analytical strategies derived directly from 
our research questions: Our research questions defined our literature which, through 
further limitation narrowed our research down to a case study which fitted both our 
research questions and our literature. When planning an analytical strategy it was 
clear that both the choice of a case study and the use of comparative analysis also had 
its limitations and implications for our project. Problems in applying the case study 
design will generally be that one case will be the source of argumentation in a much 
broader sense. The very motive of the strategy is that it permits more general 
conclusions to be drawn from analyzing it (Flick, 2009, p. 134). Our analytical 
strategy would now need to clarify in every aspect of decisions taken that it is not our 
goal to draw general conclusions on warfare decision-making, but to explain and 
analyze one certain historical event (The Iraq war). However, if one were to 
generalize, doing a number of different case studies could repair this limitation. In 
order to prevent generalization from one single event (or case) (Flick, 2009, p. 134). 
This would have been possible but we have limited our project to the case of the Iraq 
war as believe that it will strengthen our research when the time-limit is taken into 
account. 
 
This leads to our analytical strategy of choosing a comparative study. We do not 
observe the source of data from for instance Noam Chomsky (the event as interpreted 
by one source) as a whole and in its complexity, but rather a multiplicity with regard 
to particular excerpts. (Flick, 2009, p. 135) In other words, the interpretation on 
theory from one source is only interesting in connection to another theory.  
 
3.7 Induction: 
 
This section outlines our precise use of the inductive reasoning approach and how it 
will lead us to create our own theory.  
We are as before mentioned using two different theories, which will function as our 
empirical material. We are not testing a specific theory, for instance PNAC, with 
other empirical material, but rather we use the inductive approach of findings patterns 
through observations of opposing sources and through that ending with a theory. This 
theory is based on theories, which again is based on other empirical material. Instead 
of starting from theories and testing them, "sensitizing concepts" are required for 
approaching the contexts to be studied. However, contrary to widespread 
misunderstanding, these concepts are themselves influenced by previous theoretical 
knowledge. But here, theories are developed from empirical studies. (Flick, 2009 p. 
12) 
 
An inductive approach implies that we, as the researchers base our research on 
observations and available data from where our own theory stem. Our inductive 
approach to the problem area is furthermore visible in our own ethnography or “pre-
assumptions” which is either confirmed or disproved though relevant theories (or 
empirical material. Finally, inductive method is often connected to a qualitative 
research, which is dominant in our project and our way of answering our problem. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     4. Theoretical framework: 
 
Our theoretical framework is mainly consisting of conspiracy theorist Noam 
Chomsky and his theory on the US intervention in Iraq as well as Project for the New 
American Century, which outlines the official statements by the erstwhile bush 
administration that decided to intervene in Iraq. The abovementioned empirical 
material sheds light on different aspects of the war that we want to research. Why did 
the world’s only superpower decide to start a war in Iraq, what were the motives, how 
did the decision-making process develop within the Bush administration etc.   
In order to fulfill our aim of creating our own theory based on the earlier mentioned 
two different set of ideas, we acknowledged and incorporated several different 
theories concerning the Middle East and the relationship between the US and the 
Middle East in to our project. We will use these theories to create the most distinctive 
and close to ‘truthful’ theory of our own, without claiming it be truth of course.  
We came to make use of respectively, Edward W. Said’s ‘Orientalism’ and Samuel 
Huntington’s ‘Clash of Civilizations’. They are both relevant theories in relation to 
our subject.  
 
4.1 Edward W. Said – Orientalism: 
 
Edward W. Said is a Palestinian, who was sent to Harvard as a teenager and took a 
doctoral degree in comparative literature. After 20 years of absence from his native 
roots, he decided to move to Beirut where he got in touch with Arabian intellectuals. 
(E. Said, 1994, p. 2-3). He had been lectured on the Orient during his studies abroad, 
and as a resident in Beirut quickly began to realize that there was a common western 
misunderstanding of the Middle East at least from his point of view. He completed his 
work on the controversial book ‘Orientalism’ during 1975-1976.  
Edward W. Said questions many aspects of the western perception of the ‘orient’ in 
his book. He questions if it is actually possible to divide humanity into cultures, 
history, traditions, societies, races and actually survive the consequences. By 
consequences he means if it’s possible to avoid the hostility which is expressed by the 
classification of humans in e.g. us (Westerners) versus them (Orientals). He believes 
these divisions are generalizations, which have been used historically and in current 
time to appoint the distinction between different types of humans based on despicable 
goals. These generalizations create a polarization of reality that makes Orientals more 
Oriental and Westerners more Western, and decreases interaction and the exchange of 
culture and traditions across boarders.   
Furthermore Said states, that Orientalism as a way of thinking and dealing with 
foreigners from its earliest modern history until today has shown the regrettable 
tendency of containing knowledge based on so quick and straightforward designations 
as ‘East’ and ‘West’ that channels thinking into a western and eastern section. This 
tendency is quite central to Orientalist theory, practice and Western values, and takes 
it for granted that the perception of Western domination over the Orient has a status of 
scientific truth (E. Said, 1994 p.58).  
Said includes several high-level individuals statements in his theory on the Orient. He 
cites among others, Henry Kissinger former American minister of foreign affairs and 
Nobel Peace Price proprietor in his analysis of the relationship between the United 
States and the Middle East. 
 Said refers to Kissinger’s essay ‘Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy’ published in 
1966 in which Kissinger describes how America’s status as a superpower has created 
enemies throughout the history. Kissinger believes that USA can cope more easily 
with the Western industrialized world than the third-world countries (of that time) 
(China, Indochina, Middle East etc.). Power in his opinion depends on knowledge and 
information, and he declares how the western countries has acknowledged that the 
real world lies in front of the observer, and knowledge is about the collection and 
classification of this data, the more accurate the better. Kissinger refers to the 
Newtonian revolution that emerged in the developed world, and points out that the 
third-world countries has no clue about empirical reality due to the fact that they have 
not undergone the same process of acknowledging the Newtonian way of reality, 
which of course is the accurate one. Kissinger concludes in his essay; “We had our 
own Newtonian revolution, they didn’t, as logical individuals, we are better than 
them” (E. Said, 1994 p. 59) 
Many British imperialist shared the same beliefs as Kissinger and the same beliefs are 
present in our modern world today according to Said (E. Said, 1994 p. 59) 
 
4.2 Samuel Huntington – Clash of Civilizations: 
 
Samuel Huntington is commonly known as one of America’s greatest political 
scientists of all time. One of his most famous articles is ‘Clash of Civilizations’.  
The Clash of Civilizations theory depicts Huntington’s belief that the world are 
divided into various cultural blocks, such as Islamic, Hindu, Western etc.  
“During the cold war the world was divided into the first, second and third worlds. 
Those divisions are no longer relevant. It is far more meaningful now to group 
countries not in terms of their political or economic systems or in terms of their level 
of economic development but rather in terms of their culture and civilization”(S. 
Huntington, 1993, p. 23)   
 He describes the Islamic civilization as the most troublesome, because they are so 
deeply involved with their religion. In Huntington’s opinion, they favor religion over 
successful western phenomenons like democracy, certain liberal ideals etc. 
(http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/04/opinion/04brooks.html?_r=0), and are therefore 
incapable of developing successfully like we have seen in the west.  Thus, he did not 
believe that the Islamic civilization would modernize in a western direction, he 
foresaw that they would borrow tools of development from the west, but these tools 
would be influenced by their beliefs and thereby eliminate the possibility of becoming 
more western. He declared that the Muslim world has bloody borders, meaning that 
there are wars and tensions wherever the Muslim civilization comes into conflict with 
other civilizations.   
People in Arab countries were according to Huntington driven by religious ambitions 
and not by nationalistic feelings and support of the nation-state. He argued that they 
do not hunger for pluralism and democracy, as we understand such concepts in the 
west.  (http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/04/opinion/04brooks.html?_r=0)   
“Muslim; they historically belonged to the Ottoman or Tsarist empires and were only 
lightly touched by the shaping events in the rest of Europe; they are generally less 
advanced economically; they seem much less likely to develop stable democratic 
political systems.”(S. Huntington, 1993, p. 30-31). 
 
 
4.3 How does Huntington strengthen our analytical process?  
 
After investigating Said and his theory on the orient, we automatically came to think 
of Samuel Huntington’s theory ‘Clash of Civilizations’. We acknowledged certain 
similarities and dissimilarities between the two theories and concluded that they 
correlate in ways we found relevant in relation to our project.  
 
The two theories are somewhat opposing, but strengthens our analytical goal, of 
addressing motives for the US intervention in Iraq, and thoroughly investigate the 
decision-making process that led to this action.  
 
Huntington divides the world into 7 civilizations, based on religion, ethnicity, 
nationality, culture, language etc.  A civilization is according to Huntington a cultural 
entity - the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural 
identity.   
 
 He believed that every country or village shares a given culture. In Denmark the 
cities consists of cultural differences, but they have the ‘Danish’ culture in common. 
On a broader scale, continents such as Europe share another set of coherent cultural 
values that distinguishes them from e.g. Arab communities (S. Huntington, 1993, p. 
3). These cultural similarities within a given region or continent creates what 
Huntington defines as a civilization. 
 
Huntington’s approach to culture and his division of civilizations correlate with Said’s 
portrayed picture of the relation between the Orient and the western countries he 
expresses through his theory ‘Orientalism’. Said describes how the west throughout 
history has had a tendency of establishing an ‘us’ versus ‘them’ connection to the 
east. This “us versus them” tendency is also acknowledged by Huntington “As people 
define their identity in ethnic and religious terms, they are likely to see an ‘us’ versus 
‘them’ relation existing between themselves and people of different ethnicity or 
religion” (S. Huntington, 1993, p. 8).  
 
We will use Huntington to enlighten the issue of cultural hegemony, and to enhance a 
better interpretation of our empirical data, that we will investigate thoroughly in our 
analyzing section. Huntington’s theory on ‘Clash of Civilizations’ is also relevant in 
the process of strengthening Said’s view on the relation between respectively, the 
‘East’ and the ‘West’. Huntington theorizes on how differences in culture and religion 
can create hostility, and most importantly how the efforts of the West to promote its 
values of democracy and liberal thoughts as universal values in order to maintain its 
military predominance and economic advancement creates conflicting emotions and 
opinions in other civilizations (S. Huntington, 1993, p. 8).  
       
Huntington furthermore describes the Arab civilization as the most troublesome, 
because they are, as previously mentioned, so deeply involved with their religion, 
which clouds the possibilities of evolving in a proper western manner. This is yet 
another interesting perspective in the case of addressing reasons for an American 
intervention in Iraq.  
This view correlates and strengthens to an exquisite degree Said’s theory 
‘Orientalism’. In Said’s view, there has been a historically proven Western tendency 
of undermining the Arab countries, politically, culturally and economically as 
evidenced by Huntington’s view on the Arab countries as a troublesome civilization. 
Thus, Huntington’s view exhibits certain issues that Said works thoroughly with, in 
his attempt to highlight the West’s tendency to assume the role of a superior 
hegemon, which suppresses foreign countries on a variety of ‘selfish’ reasons. 
Huntington outlines a historical war-connection between the Arab countries and the 
U.S. He proclaims that the warfare between Arabs and the U.S culminated in 1990, 
when the United States sent a huge army to the Persian Gulf in order to defend some 
Arab countries against aggression by another. This type of warfare was based on a 
preventive war strategy that should eliminate potential threats, before they actually 
had a change to emerge. This strategy along with the ‘preemptive strategy’, which 
represents the opposite is discussed in our empirical material, and will be further 
discussed in our analyzing section.  
 
Many Arab countries was culturally affected by this U.S occupation and were either 
swayed and humiliated by the U.S military predominance or proud of Saddam 
Hussein because he stood up to the West and attacked Israel (S. Huntington, 1993, p. 
11). 
 
 The cultural changes in the Arab countries that occurred due to the U.S occupation is 
important for analyzing how the U.S are regarded as a powerful hegemon in our case 
of analyzing the decision-making process concerning the U.S intervention in Iraq.                     
 
The simplicity of the fact that Huntington divides the world into 7 civilizations could 
be experienced as a process in which objectification of language, culture, ethnicity etc. 
among a given amount of people takes place. This objectification and labeling of 
major areas consisting of conflicting individuals on so many levels, correlate with 
Said’s belief that wars has been initiated on weak assumptions about another ‘cultural 
entity’. Huntington opposes Said in the belief that the west is somehow obliged to 
disperse the ‘real’ form of democracy and liberal thinking. While Huntington engage 
positively in the proliferation of these ‘western’ values, this strengthens Said’s theory 
on how the west misinterprets the east and their culture entirely. Said points out the 
western ignorance displayed in such theories as Huntington’s and raises the question; 
that it might not actually be desirable to achieve ‘western values’ such as modernity, 
democracy, liberal thinking etc. These two theoreticists promote different thoughts, 
but Huntington will act as a tool with which we can illustrate and strengthen several 
key concepts in Said’s work on the Orient. 
 
4.4 How will these theories be applied in our project and are they 
comparable / do they cooperate? 
 
These two theories will function as a tool by which we can analyze our empirical data 
e.g. Noam Chomsky’s ‘Hegemony of Survival’ and Project for the New American 
Century and finally create our own theory on the subject. We believe both theories fit 
our area of research and, are comparable in many ways.  
When it comes to ‘why’ America declared war against Iraq, both of the theories 
become valuable. They will allow us as researchers to generate assumptions on 
specific aspects of the decision-making process, and help us formulate possible 
scenarios concerning the motives that lay behind the intervention.  
Said’s theory on the Orient states that Western countries has a fear of the unknown. 
They have a tendency of considering the foreign states as dangerous, which in our 
specific case would be the US versus Iraq. Did Saddam Hussein possess weapons of 
mass destruction, or was it speculations? The ability of Westerners to establish an ‘us’ 
versus ‘them’ mentality will be an important ‘hypothesis’ to keep in mind when 
analyzing empirical material published by respectively; supporters and critics of the 
intervention.  
 
Said’s theory on Orientalism will be our main analytical tool, and the vanishing point 
of our analysis section. We will assume the role of orientalists, and adopt concepts, 
notions and themes expressed in Said’s work.    
 
While Said states that the Western world has a fear of the unknown, parts of 
Huntington’s theory on clash of civilizations indicate that the west is superior and 
somewhat obliged to rule. The west has obtained the perfect form of democracy, 
while the third-world countries are not capable of developing such a system 
themselves.    
 
These two theories cooperate perfectly in relation to our subject. They shed light on 
different aspects of the power relation between the West and East historically as well 
as in current time. While Huntington might illustrate some arguments, as to why 
America should intervene, Said’s theory as a tool give us a skeptical edge, when 
arriving at the analyzing section, were it will be applied on our empirical material.  
The validity of our desired theory thus depends on our ability to be selective in our 
choice of the use of the empirical material.  
 
4.5 Connection between Orientalism and Hegemony or Survival: 
 
From what we have observed, Said’s book Orientalism elaborates Antonio Gramsci’s 
theories of hegemony. Antonio Gramsci had theorized about what he called “cultural 
hegemony” (A. Bullock, S. Trombley, 1994, p. 1215). The term cultural hegemony 
stems from the Marxist philosophy and is used to describe the domination of a diverse 
culture of society by the “ruling class” (….) Gramsci further developed the theory to 
include the aspects of social class, so that it became a sociological theory, which 
analyzed how the social norms established creates social structures (economic and 
social classes) (Chernow, et al., 1994) 
 
According to this theory, the ruling class manipulates the culture of society - its 
beliefs, explanations, perceptions, values and so on. This manipulation has the means 
of establishing the “Weltanschauung”, which means worldview in German. The 
ruling class imposes this worldview, so that it becomes the accepted cultural norm or 
the universal valid dominant ideology. This universal valid dominant ideology 
supposedly justifies the economic, social and political status quo as natural, 
inevitable, and beneficial for everyone. Theorists like Gramsci would argue otherwise 
and say that this universal valid dominant ideology is rather an artificial social 
construct, which primarily benefits the ruling class. (A. Bullock, S. Trombley, 1999. 
387–88) 
 
The term cultural hegemony derives ideas from its second verb hegemony. Hegemony 
is an ancient Greek word, which means leadership and rule. It’s a term used within 
political science and most commonly refers to the geopolitical method of indirect 
imperial dominance, with which the hegemon, that in our case is the USA, rules sub-
ordinate states. This hegemonic rule is usually conducted through the means of soft 
powers or sanctions defined as the threat of military intervention. In the case of Iraq 
the hegemon, the US, exercised its rule through direct military invasion and 
occupation.   
 
Aside from Gramsci’s sociological explanation of Hegemony, he also derives the 
political scientific denotation of the word as a concept of leadership. 
 
In the more contemporary elaborations of inter alia Gramsci’s theories of hegemony, 
the term is defined as the political relationship and power wherein subordinate 
societies, preform social tasks that are culturally unnatural and non-beneficial to them, 
but instead primarily benefit the imperial interests of the hegemon. The hegemon is 
the superior, ordinate power and the hegemonic structure is a military, political; and 
economic relationship, which arises as an articulation within political discourse 
(Laclau, Ernest; Mouffe, Chantal, 2001). Anna Cornelia Beyer analyzed the 
contemporary hegemony of the US and the example of its global war on terrorism 
(Beyer, 2010). 
 
Said extracts certain elements of Antonio Gramsci’s theory on ‘cultural hegemony’ in 
order to explain orientalism’s extent. The result of ‘cultural hegemony’ especially in 
the unfolding phase had a major impact on his theory concerning the orient (E. Said, 
1994, p. 17). Said were greatly influenced by Gramsci’s notion of hegemony, and 
elaborates on the concept in his analysis of the Orient. He comments on the relation 
between the exercise of power over the Orient and the historical development of 
Western hegemony.     
 
Orientalism is according to Said also closely related to what Denys Hay called 
‘Europe’s Idea’, which is a collective notion of ‘us’ the Europeans in contrast to 
‘them’ the non-European.  
Said states that the main component in European culture is actually the component 
that made the European culture hegemonic: European identity as superior in 
comparison with every non-European countries and cultures.  
 
Furthermore, there is the hegemony of European perceptions about the Orient, which 
also illustrates the European superiority over the less-developed Orient.  
Orientalism is created from this distribution of power and the Western tendency of 
considering the Orient as something less, which has been consistent throughout the 
history.  
 
Based on knowledge about the Orient, and under the guise of Western hegemony over 
the Orient, a very complex idea of the Orient emerged which laid the foundation for 
further academic studies that subsequently justified an index of economic and social 
theories on development, revolution, cultural personality and religious character. This 
scrutiny of the Orient was solely based on a Western notion of what they considered 
as the Orient, but were nonetheless considered as empirically proven reality (E. Said, 
1994, p.17). Said elaborates on Gramsci’s theory among others in order to present his 
theory on the Orient.  
      
Apart from Gramsci’s theory of cultural hegemony Said also integrates Foucault’s 
theory of discourse and the relationship between knowledge and power (this 
theoretical concept will be explained in further detail) 
 
There is a strong correlation between Chomsky’s theory in Hegemony or Survival and 
Said’s theory of Orientalism. Chomsky and Said both speak of matters concerning 
hegemony.  Said integrates the more sociological aspect of the concept hegemony e.g. 
through Antonio Gramsci’s theories of cultural hegemony, while Chomsky speaks of 
it in a more political scientific sense. These two theories fit perfectly into our problem 
area and our interdisciplinary choice of political science and sociology. With the use 
of these theories, we will be able to analyze the theoretical principles underlying the 
US’s hegemonic rule politically and sociologically, in its domestic arena, as well as 
on a global scale.  
 
There is a distinct connection between E. Said’s concept of Orientalism and 
Chomsky’s very critical view on the US usage of their power and their status as 
global hegemon. The breach and disobeying of the UN Charter is a clear example of 
how the US is politically using their global status without any consequences. 
 
Chomsky is very focused on the portrayal of Iraq, just as we will elaborate this in the 
analyzing section. According to the theory of orientalism it should not be very hard to 
portray the Middle East as a natural opponent to western values and culture. There are 
differences to be found in culture, religion and political power usage. It is through an 
orientalist lens possible to understand just how a public opinion was skewed towards 
a judgement of Iraq in connection to the 9/11. The perception of the US as the cultural 
hegemon can be utilized to explain how the difference in culture could lay basis for 
the public motives of spread of democracy, removal of tyrant dictators etc. that we 
interpret as crucial in order for stability.   
 
 
 
 
     5. Main empirical material:   
5.1 Noam Chomsky: Hegemony or Survival: Americas Quest for 
Global Dominance 
 
“Hegemony or Survival: Americas Quest for Global Dominance” is a conspiracy 
theory revolving the primacy of the American Empire and it’s continuous growth of 
influence and power in the global arena. Conspiracy theories are often waved off as 
farfetched, inconsistent with reality and of lacking evidence. Contrarily one could 
argue that, despite it’s large criticism by the US’s and UK’s mainstream media, 
Hegemony and Survival is backed up by thorough empirical data and is written by 
one of the most acknowledged and quoted scholars within political academia, Noam 
Chomsky.  
 
Noam Chomsky is a linguist and political activist and teaches as a professor at 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. His political orientation is leftist. He identifies 
himself as a social libertarian and sympathizes with anarcho-syndicalism.  
 
Chomsky’s theory in short, says that the United States economic elite, such as 
members of the White House and corporate leaders, has pursued what is called the 
“Imperial Grand Strategy” (N. Chomsky, 2003, p. 11).  The goal of this strategy is to 
obtain and sustain the United States position as the global hegemony through 
economic, military and political measures: “One well known international affairs 
specialist, John Ikenberry, describes the declaration as a “grand strategy that begins 
with a fundamental commitment to maintaining a unipolar world in which the United 
States has no peer competitor“ a condition that is to be permanent so that no state or 
coalition could ever challenge the US as global leader , protector and enforcer.” It is 
explained how this strategy dismisses international law and e.g. “renders international 
norms of self-defense – enshrined by article 51 of the UN Charter – almost 
meaningless.” The doctrine generally considers international law and institutions as of 
little value (N. Chomsky, 2003, p. 11). 
 
One of Chomsky’s main focuses in the context of the “Imperial Grand Strategy” is 
how it has undermined international law by asserting the US the right to undertake 
“preventive war”, and not “preemptive war” (N. Chomsky 2003, p. 12). According to 
Chomsky, the U.S. government has also blocked UN efforts to ban the militarization 
of space and terminated international negotiations to prevent biological warfare to 
furthermore ensure the inevitability of an attack on Iraq. All of this had been done 
despite a popular global opposition, which was without historical precedent (N. 
Chomsky, 2003, p. 2).     
 
Chomsky predicts, that if the U.S. government continues to conduct these types of 
unilateral political decisions, it will threaten the very existence of human kind in that 
the US government, in contrary to its spoken intentions, is actually causing the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the threat of terrorism instead of 
eliminating it.  
 
The book Hegemony or Survival becomes most useful to us in the chapter called  
“The Iraq Connection”.  The book far from revolves around the Iraq war alone, but 
the war is used as one example of the many “plays” made by the US government to 
ensure their agenda of maintaining their position as the global superpower.  
 
Before we go into details of this chapter, it is of contextual importance to mention the 
topic of the Public Relations (PR) industry, which Chomsky describes earlier in the 
book. Chomsky explains that “public relations” is just a sugarcoated word for the 
taboo-word “propaganda.” He describes it as an industry that was developed to 
“ensure that “the great beast” as Alexander Hamilton called the people, does not stray 
from its proper confines.” The PR industry was to be responsible for “manufacturing 
of consent,” a “self-conscious art and regular organ of popular government. It was to 
be a “practice of democracy” that should enable a “specialized class” to manage the 
“common interest” that “very largely elude public opinion entirely”. It is a method of 
“molding public opinion” to fit the agendas of the “intelligent minority” in power, 
which Chomsky states, is still thoroughly practiced in the US today (N. Chomsky 
2003, pp. 5-8).  
 
Chomsky’s explanation of the PR industry is very helpful as background-knowledge, 
since he focuses upon how this industry portrayed George W. Bush, his 
administration, terrorism and the reasons for an invasion of Iraq in the chapter “The 
Iraq Connection.”  
 
In the Chapter “The Iraq Connection” Chomsky takes one back to the beginning of 
the US government’s involvement in Iraq in the 1980’s, under the Ronald Reagan 
administration.  Chomsky argues that the rhetoric used by the Reagan administration 
to manufacture consent for a military intervention in Iraq was much the same as the 
rhetoric use by George W. bush and his administration in the prelude to the Iraq war 
in 2003 (N. Chomsky 2003, p 109).  
 
Noam Chomsky also argues that the Bush administration, like the Reagan 
administration, utilized the fear of war and terrorism to distract the public from its 
poor economic situation and to furthermore ensure their social and economic policies 
and goals (N. Chomsky 2003, p 120). 
 
Chomsky states, that critical questions, such as: “what constitutes terrorism?”, failed 
to be brought up in the mainstream media and in the arena of public discussion in 
general.  He explains that, the convenient definition of terrorism was adopted: 
“terrorism is what our leaders declare it to be. Period. The practice continues as the 
war is declared.” (N. Chomsky 2003, p. 110). 
 
According to Chomsky, after a surge of presidential popularity following 9/11, polls 
showed a discontent for the Bush administration’s social and political policies. This 
meant that the administration was compelled to adopt “the classic modern strategy of 
endangered right-wing oligarchy, which to divert mass discontent into nationalism.” 
Chief Political Advisor, Karl Rove, stated that in order to maintain political power: 
“the Republicans must go to the country on the issue of national security in November 
2002.” The international analyst for United Press International (UPI), Martin Sieff, 
pointed out: “that as long as the domestic issues were dominating news coverage 
political battles over summer, the Republican Party was loosing ground. Martin Sieff 
continues and says that the imminent threat of Iraq was conjured up just in time in 
September 2002 and explained the following: “The administration is campaigning to 
sustain and increase power and a policy of international adventurism, new radical 
preemptive military strategies, and a hunger for a politically convenient and perfectly 
timed confrontation with Iraq” (N. Chomsky, 2003, p 120). 
 
Despite the great discontent for the domestic policies being practiced by the Bush 
administration, the citizens of America still trusted the Republican Party when it came 
to national security. George W. Bush’s PR specialists and speechwriters made sure to 
portray his presidency as a “simple man”, with “a direct line to heaven”, relying on 
his “gut instincts” as he strew forward to “rid the world of evildoers”, while 
contemplating his “visions” and “dreams.” As Chomsky puts it, it was a “caricature of 
ancient epics and children’s tales, with an admixture of cowboy fantasy.” (N. 
Chomsky, 2003, p. 109). 
 
This manufacturing of fear generated enough of a popular base for the invasion of 
Iraq. The National Security Strategy was announced in September 2002, which 
instituted the new norm of “aggressive war at will” and made it possible for the Bush 
administration to sustain their political power as well as continue their “harsh and 
unpopular domestic agenda.” (N. Chomsky, 2003, p. 121). 
 
Chomsky also cites the US government’s historical hypocrisy of supporting a variety 
of gruesome dictators, here including Saddam Hussein, until they disobeyed or didn’t 
serve their interests any longer. As soon as they were of no significance for the US 
government, they were tyrannized and labeled as enemies of the western world (N. 
Chomsky, 2003). 
 
Noam Chomsky continues to explain the details of the Iraq connection, and its part in 
the greater conspiracy of the “Imperial Grand Strategy”.  
 
In a part of the chapter “The Iraq Connection”, Chomsky lists the many arguments 
against the invasion of Iraq as well as the many risks it would entail, that he 
sarcastically calls “Insignificant Risks”. In this part of the chapter he explains that the 
war on Iraq was undertaken despite the recognition that it most likely would lead to 
the proliferation of WMD and terror. Chomsky calls the risks “insignificant”, in that 
the Bush administration regarded them so, compared to the prospect of gaining 
control over Iraq (N. Chomsky 2003. p. 121). 
 
Apparently the Bush administration had “abandoned an international effort to 
strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention against germ war” and stated that 
further discussions on this matter had to be postponed for at least 4 years. In this 
context, Chomsky notes that it in mid October (evidently the 13.) was learned that “in 
an earlier episode of playing with fire, the world was brought close to nuclear war. 
Ten days after this was brought to notice, the UN Disarmament Committee adopted 
two resolutions. The first was to ensure stronger measures to prevent the 
militarization of space. This resolution was supposed to “avert a grave danger for 
international peace and security.” The second was to reaffirm the 1925 Geneva 
Protocol, which prohibited the use of poisonous gases and bacteriological methods of 
warfare. These resolutions apparently passed unanimously, except for two abstentions 
form the US and Israel. Chomsky explains that US abstention usually amounts to a 
veto, as well as typically being a “double veto”, which bans the events from reporting 
and history. This was why there was no mention of it in the mainstream media, 
according to Chomsky (N. Chomsky, 2003, p. 121).  
 
Chomsky states that the CIA Director, George Tenet sent message to the Senate 
Intelligence Committee char, Bob Graham, with information stating the following: 
“although there was little likelihood that Saddam would initiate a terrorist operation 
with conventional weapons or any chemical or biological he might have, the 
probability would rise to “pretty high” in the event of US attack.” (N. Chomsky, 
2003, p. 122). The FBI had also reported: “that a war with Iraq could trigger new 
domestic terrorism risks.” The head of Homeland Security had reported the same as 
well and similar reports kept rolling in. The leading military-intelligence journal and 
allied intelligence agencies depicted similar conclusions. They quantified that a US 
attack on Iraq would intensify Islamic terrorism instead of reducing it, in that it would 
“globalize anti-American and anti-Western sentiment.” Furthermore it was stated that 
a war on Iraq threatened to fuel unrest and conjure new terrorist threats. Mainstream 
experts also agreed that an attack from the most powerful military force in history (the 
US) would stimulate a quest for revenge or deterrence. International relations scholars 
had pointed out, that that he potential targets of US adventurism were well aware that 
the only way to keep the US at bay was by the means of deterrence, primarily with the 
use of WMD. Do to these potential targets knowledge of this: “American policies 
stimulate the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons and promote their spreading 
from one country to another.” The same policies would also stimulate terrorism. (N. 
Chomsky, 2003, p. 122) (Kenneth Waltz). It was argued that this theory of possible 
consequences was self-evident: “Unsurprisingly... weak states and disaffected people 
… lash out at the United States as the agent or symbol of their suffering.” (N. 
Chomsky, 2003, p. 123).   
 
A terrorist specialist by the name Daniel Benjamin had also observed and stated that 
the Iraq invasion might well be the cause of “the greatest proliferation disaster in 
history.” (N. Chomsky, 2003, p. 123).  
 
Despite Saddam Hussein being a brutal tyrant, he was considered a rational one 
nonetheless. Chomsky argues, that if he had had chemical, biological weapons, they 
would have been kept under tight control and “subjected to a proper chain of 
command.” (N. Chomsky, 2003, p. 123). He insists that Hussein surely wouldn’t have 
put these weapons into the possession of the “Osama bin Ladens of the world, a 
terrible threat to Saddam himself.” Berg continues to argue that Iraq society, under 
attack by the US, might collapse and with it its control over the WMD’s. In this loss 
of control, the WMD’s might be offered to the huge market for “unconventional 
weapons”. This hypothesis was considered a “nightmare scenario.” (N. Chomsky 
2003, p. 123).  
 
Chomsky lists the prewar establishment critiques’ important concerns and points.  
First of all there was a concern about the posture of a “rogue superpower”, here 
referring to the unilateral US, which was considered “the single greatest external 
threat to their societies.” (N. Chomsky, 2003, p. 124).  
 
Secondly, the prewar establishment critique encompassed an unusually broad 
spectrum of voices. One of the voices was the abovementioned comments cited from 
US and world intelligence agencies and Chomsky continues to list the following 
voices: “ the world’s leading military journal; the January 2003 issue of the two major 
national foreign policy journals; an unusual publication of the American Academy of 
Arts and Sciences; some respected specialists on international affairs, terrorism, and 
strategic analysis; and even the “wizards of Davos” who dominate the world’s 
economy.” (N. Chomsky, 2003, p. 124). Chomsky states, that a historical precedent 
for such a critique of a planned war, prior to its launch, is very hard to find. Just like it 
is hard to find historical precedent for popular opposition to a war, he adds (N. 
Chomsky, 2003, p. 124).  
 
 
5.2 Project for the New American Century’s Theory of the Iraq War 
(Iraq: Setting the Record Straight) 
 
 
Setting the record straight is a project report for the New American Century. The New 
American Century is a non-profit American educational organization, created to 
promote the American global leadership and hegemony. It was initiated by a group of, 
more or less, well known American neoconservatives; William Kristol, Robert Kagan, 
Bruce P. Jackson, Mark Gerson, Randy Scheunemann and Gary Schmitt. Together 
they have created this report, which is containing all of the American political reasons 
for the Iraq Intervention, from a neo-conservative point of view (Project for a New 
American Century, 2005).  
PNAC forged an influential coalition of rightist politicians in support for its calls for 
an aggressive war on terror, with the primary aim pointed at the Middle East. PNAC 
almost “developed, sold, enacted, and justified a war with Iraq”. The group was 
arguably the most effective proponent of neoconservative ideas during the period 
between the beginning of president Bill Clinton’s second term and president George 
W. Bush’s 2003 decision to invade Iraq (Rightweb, 2013). 
 
"[The United States must conduct] a foreign policy that boldly and purposefully 
promotes American principles abroad; and national leadership that accepts the United 
States' global responsibilities” (Project for a New American Century, 2005, founding 
statement of principles of the Project for a New American Century 
 - A quote from the founding principles of The New American Century; it sums up the 
conception that is obtained by the American government and the other 
neoconservatives - who effected the decisions that led to the war - concerning how 
The United States is supposed to act as an international leader. – As they did when 
intervening in Iraq, and preventing – what they called – a concern on the threat that 
Saddam Hussein posed to the order of the Middle East. 
“Our chief concern in 1998, like Berger's, was the threat Saddam posed to regional 
security and stability, the maintenance of which was in large part the responsibility of 
the United States.”(Project for a New American Century, 2005, p.81). 
 
The inevitable question to rise: Was it right to go to war? 
 In this report the New American Century are striving to hand you all of the reasons 
that should legitimate the intervention of Iraq. As Chomsky, the people behind this 
report are very convincing with their arguments, as well as they are very selective 
concerning what they would like to investigate – and on the other hand, what, 
according to them, does not need any further investigation, as for example the many 
undeniable ties between Saddam Hussein and a variety of terrorists. 
 
“Saddam's pursuit of weapons of mass destruction was inextricably intertwined with 
the nature of his tyrannical rule, his serial aggression, his defiance of international 
obligations, and his undeniable ties to a variety of terrorists, from Abu Nidal to al 
Qaeda (a topic we will not cover in detail here, rather referring readers to Stephen F. 
Hayes's reporting in this magazine over the past year).” (Project for a New American 
Century, 2005, p.78). 
 
The problem was, according to the American government, that Saddam Hussein was 
so eager to obtain more power and to enlarge his arsenal of weapons. So a 
containment, which would be preferred by the most of people because it probably 
would not lead to any kind of bigger wars, was not going to be enough to secure both 
the US national security and to secure the regional Middle Eastern security, and 
furthermore it was a costly policy, both in terms of economic and strategic. Berger 
argued that; the longer the standoff continued, the harder it will be to maintain, 
because the events that has occurred past years, has left the international community 
vulnerable to manipulation by Saddam Hussein (Project for a New American Century, 
2005). 
And this uncertainty on how fast the risk of Saddam Hussein was increasing, was yet 
another problem. The New American century argued that this uncertainty had a 
seriously destabilizing effect on the entire Middle East (Project for a New American 
Century, 2005). 
 
New American Century argues that the intervention was not a case of imminence; it 
was not the case, that if The United States did not act, a weapon would be used 
against them. But the case was rather that, if action were not taken soon, it would be 
too difficult and dangerous to react towards Saddam Hussein. If The United states did 
not act rapidly, then it was foreseen that Saddam Hussein would be to far with his 
programs of weapons of mass destruction, though there were no certainties that 
Saddam Hussein would be using these weapons himself.  
 - But if he would not be using them himself, then there was a broad unanimity on that 
Saddam Hussein, and Iraq, would be the terrorists main supplier of weapons of mass 
destruction (Project for a New American Century, 2005). 
 
 
According to the Americans there were not too few reasons, concerning “Why to 
intervene in Iraq?”  
In December 1998, senator Madeleine Albright among other things uses history to 
argue on why The United States should be initiating a preventive war. 
“If the world had been firmer with Hitler earlier, then chances are that we might not 
have needed to send Americans to Europe during the  
Second World War.” (Project for a New American Century, 2004, p. IV) 
This quotation is also a good example of how the politicians and political think tanks 
manipulated with the audience and maximized the use of spin, to bulldoze through 
with their cause.  
In the report by the Project for a New American Century “Iraq – Setting The Record 
Straight” it is also clear, that the goal of the report was to convince the reader, that the 
Iraq intervention was the right thing to do. This is of course because the people 
behind the report, among others Robert Kagan, all are supporters of the 
encouragement of The United States hegemony in the world order. It is also clear that, 
as Chomsky (the conflicting theorist) PNAC are very selective concerning what they 
wish to explain, and on the other hand things that are common knowledge. 
“Saddam's pursuit of weapons of mass destruction was inextricably intertwined with 
the nature of his tyrannical rule, his serial aggression, his defiance of international 
obligations, and his undeniable ties to a variety of terrorists, from Abu Nidal to al 
Qaeda (a topic we will not cover in detail here, rather referring readers to Stephen F. 
Hayes's reporting in this magazine over the past year).” (Project for a New American 
Century, 2005, p.78). In this quotation, it is clear that; as there was never found any 
pervasive evidence on these matters, then PNAC does not believe that it is a topic that 
needs to be covered in details. 
 
When the terrorist attack occurred on September 9th, 2001, the issue of Iraq and their 
weapons of mass destruction, and Saddam Hussein’s link to several terrorists, 
naturally roused.  
It had not been a topic that was discussed much in the presidential election of the 
2000 election. But this was not because neither of the candidates believed that it has 
ceased to be an urgent and growing problem. Actually the Bush-administration, in 
retrospect ironically, ran a campaign promising that promised a more restrained 
America with a less active international role. But that did not mean that the issue was 
of less significance (Project for a New American Century, 2005). But when the 
terrorist attack of 9/11 occurred, the war on terror was truly initiated, and the issue of 
Iraq, their terror regime, and their secretiveness concerning weapons of mass 
destruction, returned to the fore. 
 
 “For all the reasons that Berger had outlined, Saddam's regime itself was the problem, 
above and beyond his weapons capabilities. It was an obstacle to progress in the 
Middle East and the Arab world. It was a threat to the Iraqi people and to Iraq's 
neighbors. But a big part of the threat involved Saddam's absolute determination to 
arm himself with both conventional and unconventional weapons” (Project for a New 
American Century, 2005, p.84). 
According to this paragraph from the report from the New American Century, 
Saddam Hussein was one of the main reasons for entering Iraq. Incontrovertibly he 
was one of the main obstacles for the United States, to keep them from entering the 
market of the Middle East, with his hostile perception of the United States and the rest 
of the western world. Also he was an obstacle for the evolution of the region, the 
progress of becoming fully industrialized.  
“…by attempting to acquire the lion's share of the region's oil and by intimidating or 
destroying anyone who stood in his way.” This also was a reason to initiate the 
regime-change, which should liberate the oil reserves of Iraq and the rest of the 
Middle East (Project for a New American Century, 2005, p.79). 
 
 
In retrospect, when one is aware that the weapons of mass destruction was never to be 
found, it is clear that one of the, also when the war was initiated, larger goals of the 
intervention was to create a regime-change in Iraq, to impose a new western friendly 
democratic government, which would be a great factor in easing the progress of 
evolving the countries in that region.  
 
5.3 Why / how did we choose our empirical material? 
 
Our main empirical material concerning the US decision-making process in relation to 
the Iraq war consists, of a theory that is supportive towards the US intervention and a 
theory that is critical towards the same.  
 
It is thus important to mention, that these two theories will only function as empirical 
knowledge and not as theories applicable in the analyzing section. 
As our main objective with this specific assignment is, too create our own theory by 
analyzing two opposing sides we acknowledged that we would have to choose valid 
representatives from both sides of the fences, figuratively speaking.  
We browsed through the web as well as the library and made use of practically 
everything published about the Iraq war and the decision-making process that led to 
it. We committed to a large amount of reading, and finally agreed upon two theories 
that matched our expectations of the project.   
We came to make use of the well-regarded American linguist Noam Chomsky and a 
yet to be found theory.  
We chose this specific empirical material because we believe it represents our area of 
research in the best possible way. We were all inextricably fixed at the thought of 
using Noam Chomsky’s theory as empirical knowledge but had some trouble with the 
selection of an opposing account of material.  
 
Noam Chomsky’s book ‘Hegemony or Survival’ outlines a conspiracy theory 
concerning the Iraq war, and represents a skeptical point of view in relation the 
American decision – making process.  
 
We have found an organization called Project for the New American Century 
(PNAC), which has written a report called Iraq: Setting the Record Straight, which we 
will use primarily. Aside from this report the organization has a website called 
newamaricancentury.org which contains a large amount of articles, reports and 
speeches revolving the Iraq War. 
 
While it might be untraditional, to use theories as empirical material we figured it 
suits our assignment perfectly. By using theories as empirical material, we believe it 
encourages the inductive process of creating our own theory as a final product of our 
analyzing section (Said, Huntington).    
 
Another reason why we chose this specific empirical material is the fact that we found 
them to be valid and extremely applicable in the case of shedding light on the decision 
– making process and intervention in Iraq. After conducting a decent amount of 
source criticism, we found these two theories to be valid which enhances our ability to 
create the best possible theory of our own. 
 
How does the issue of using theories as empirical material function: 
We will use respectively, Noam Chomsky who represents a critical point of view in 
connection to the intervention, and the members of ‘PNAC’ (Project for a New 
American Century) who represents the supportive force. These two theories will act 
as our empirical material.  
By using theories as empirical material, we aim to reveal the ‘problem’ of 
objectifying.  
We engage in a process of objectifying the objectifiers. Instead of using clearly biased 
theories on the US intervention in Iraq as components in an analysis, we investigate 
their contents and reveal their limitations in the case of objectifying the respective 
other culturally, socially and politically. 
We are convinced that by using objectifying theories objectively we will be able to 
expose the limitations the respective theories consist of.  
 In order to reveal the limitations of this empirical material we will use a different 
spectrum of theories that will enforce a consistent analyzing process, and finally 
enable us to propose our own inductive made theory   
In the process of using pre-existing theories as empirical material, we aim to extract 
certain contrastive ideas, which will display how objectifications can lay basis for 
interventions such as the one in Iraq. 
Our analytical strategy is thus the acts of bringing in empirical material others use as 
theories and analyze this material with the use of e.g. Said and finally end up with a 
new perception of the Iraq intervention.   
The aim of our analytical strategy is furthermore to promote an effective analysis and 
encourage an evidence-based approach to political and sociological issues concerning 
the American intervention in Iraq.  
     6. Analysis 
 
6.1 Introduction to the analysis: 
 
We are interested in examining the cases for Iraq made by respectively Chomsky and 
PNAC. We want to compare and analyze their differing theories and perspectives on 
the matter. The analysis will start with an examination of the role of the US as the 
superpower/hegemon in the global arena and the differing theories of how they are to 
conduct their foreign policy. We will then examine how PNAC and Chomsky 
portrayed Iraq and the US, the degree to which Saddam posed a threat, and the 
predictions of risks associated with action or inaction.  
When we have analyzed these to cases of the Iraq war, we will put on an “orientalist 
lens”, if you will. We will use the theoretical concepts we have learned from Said’s 
book Orientalism to analyze and explain the theoretical principles underlying the two 
different perspectives. We know prior to our analytical process, that the two theories 
of the Iraq are attempts to objectify the case. With the “orientalist lens” we hope to 
“objectify the objectifiers” and reveal the limitations of their theories.   
6.2 The US’s role in the global arena, the imminence of Iraqi threat 
and the discourse of Preemptive/preventive war? 
 
Our investigation will begin at the very core of the official government statements 
concerning the United States’ global role – The National Security Strategy by the fall 
of 2002 and “the project for the new American century’s” founding statement of 
principles of 1997-2005. It is nowhere covert, neither in the National Security 
Strategy nor in the Project for a New American Century (PNAC) that America has a 
responsibility not only domestically but most certainly also globally. Apart from 
claiming its purpose of promoting American global leadership PNAC describes the 
optimal foreign policy of The United States to be “a foreign policy that boldly and 
purposefully promotes American principles abroad; and national leadership that 
accepts the United States' global responsibilities” (Project for the New American 
Century, 2005, founding statement of principles of the Project for a New American 
Century).  This is essentially an American Exceptionalist stance: “American 
exceptionalism is the proposition that the United States is different from other 
countries in that it has a specific world mission to spread liberty and democracy” 
(Winfried Fluck et al (2011). Re-Framing the Transnational Turn in American 
Studies. UP New England. p. 207). 
 This culturally expansive statement is almost interchangeable with the one made in 
2002 in the National Security Strategy: "Our forces will be strong enough to dissuade 
potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or 
equaling, the power of the United States" (N. Chomsky, 2003, p. 11). In other words: 
[America aims to] “maintain its hegemony through the threat or use of military force, 
the dimension of power in which it reigns supreme” (N. Chomsky, 2003, p. 11).  
International Affairs specialist John Ikenberry describes the declaration as a grand 
strategy to keep America’s position as the world hegemon leader, protector and 
enforcer in unipolar world where no state could ever challenge this hierarchy (N. 
Chomsky, 2003, p. 11). According to Noam Chomsky the “Imperial Grand Strategy”, 
in Ikenberry’s rhetoric, violates the international norms of self-defense from Article 
51 of the UN Charter and dismisses international law in general. Article 51 asserts the 
right of self-defense if attacked by another country:  
“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United 
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain 
international peace and security.” 
Noam Chomsky sets the official statements made in the National Security Strategy, or 
in his terms, and as we will continue to call it, “the Imperial Grand Strategy, in 
comparison to the declarations of the UN Charter, article 51. The terms of 
preemptive/preventive war is now relevant when Chomsky uses an extract from Carl 
Kaysens War with Iraq: Costs, Consequences, and Alternatives from 2002: The 
imperial grand strategy asserts the right of the United States to undertake "preventive 
war" at will: Preventive, not preemptive (N. Chomsky, 2003, p. 12). Chomsky 
furthermore continues: ”Preemptive war might fall within the framework of 
international law […] the justifications for preemptive war, whatever they might be, 
do not hold for preventive war, particularly as that concept is interpreted by its current 
enthusiasts: the use of military force to eliminate an imagined or invented threat, so 
that even the term preventive is too charitable.” (N. Chomsky, 2003, p. 12). Chomsky 
makes use of Kennedy adviser Arthur Schlesinger’s take on the declaration, in which 
he writes that “The president has adopted a policy of "anticipatory self-defense" (N. 
Chomsky, 2003, p. 12) Even though the word “preventive” is never mentioned 
directly in the Project for the New American Century statement of principles, but 
rather mentioned in connection to the US necessary exercise of power, it is interesting 
to compare the PNAC statement on preventing threats to Noam Chomsky’s own 
example of preventive/preemptive war, which is not far from the UN Charters before 
mentioned declaration on this very same matter.  
Chomsky makes an example of Russian bombers being detected approaching the US 
from the Grenada military base in 1983, with a clear intend to bomb. Hypothetically, 
The US could with a reasonable interpretation of the UN Charter, preemptively and 
justifiably eliminate the Russian bombers along with the military base (N. Chomsky, 
2003, p. 12). The threat is in this example clear and undeniable. However, the 
prevention of threats, even before they emerge is stated by PNAC. The term of 
preventive war can easily be interpreted from the PNAC statement: “The history of 
the 20th century should have taught us that it is important to shape circumstances 
before crises emerge, and to meet threats before they become dire” (Project for the 
New American Century, 2005, founding statement of principles of the Project for a 
New American Century). To meet threats before they become dire, by the means of 
invasion and military is, at least according to Chomsky, an act of preventive war. 
The UN Charter’s definition of preemptive/preventive war along with the use of force, 
does seem “meaningless” according to Chomsky (N. Chomsky, 2003, p. 11) and held 
against both the Imperial Grand Strategy and the PNAC founding statement of 
principles it seems very clear that at least some aspects of the UN Charter were either 
ignored or rendered obsolete compared to the proclaimed role the US posses to 
“maintain peace and security in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East” (Project for the 
New American Century, 2005, founding statement of principles of the Project for a 
New American Century).  
Chomsky furthermore continues this issue by addressing that “Washington "made it 
clear that it intends to do all it can to maintain its preeminence," then "announced 
that it would ignore" the UN Security Council over Iraq and declared more broadly 
that "it would no longer be bound by the [UN] Charter's rules governing the use of 
force." 
6.3 The case for Iraq and its portrayal 
 
It has already been mentioned many times throughout our empirical material, also the 
quotes that have already been presented, that the US has a strong interest and 
intentions of maintaining the unipolar world order along with preventing any 
challenges or threats that might arrive to challenge it. It is their responsibility to 
uphold peace and stability in this world order. PNAC does, in that connection state; 
“If we shirk our responsibilities, we invite challenges to our fundamental interests.” 
The case for an Iraq invasion and the portrayal of both the “enemy” and the portrayal 
of US themselves is found to be very important in order to discover which theoretical 
principles that were behind the invasion of Iraq. 
In 2003 an article was presented on PNAC’s website written by Gary Schmitt, the 
executive director of the Project for the New American Century. The article raises the 
issue of America’s crucial duty to exercise power in the global arena to ensure peace 
in the world: “The unavoidable reality is that the exercise of American power is key 
to maintaining what peace and order there is in the world today.”(Los Angeles Times, 
2003). Exercise of power is in this statement closely connected to The US’ role of a 
peacemaker – That it, because of its enormous power, both military and politically, is 
thereby entitled to make use of this power in a manner or with the purpose of 
“maintaining peace”.  
Garry Schmitt continues, claiming that a world without the US as global leader would 
not have been able to handle the historical threats to global peace, such as Tyrants and 
Islamic terrorists. He argues, that no other country or unions could have dealt with 
these threats as efficiently as the US (Los Angeles Times, 2003). 
He addresses the critics of US foreign policy, whom largely criticize the American 
unilateral political decision-making and its position as “world police”. He refers to 
director of PNAC, Robert Kagans book “Paradise and Power”, and cites his analogic 
example of the US governments position as superpower/police in the global arena.  
The analogy compares this global issue to a similar situation in a small town from a 
movie called “High Moon”.  The US position is much the same as the Marshall, Will 
Kane, the town’s law enforcement and it is hereby written that:  
“The townspeople are more than happy to live in the peace brought by his law 
enforcement but are nervous and resentful when the bad guys come back to town 
looking for him, to enact their revenge. The residents shortsightedly believe that if the 
marshal would just leave town, there would be no trouble. Of course, the reverse is 
true. Without Kane to protect them, the town would quickly fall into an anarchic state, 
paralyzed by ruthless gunslingers.” (Los Angeles Times, 2003). 
Gary Schmitt continues, that the fundamental point is, that it matters more what 
purpose the US government’s power serves, than the fact that they have power.  He 
says, that by infiltrating Iraq and removing Hussein, will not only diminish the threat 
he posed, but also begin a regime change in Iraq. This would further cut the nexus 
between weapons of mass destruction and terrorists (Los Angeles Times, 2003). 
Gary Schmitt argues that this, like the townsfolk in “High Noon”, makes many in the 
global populace uneasy. He states that change always brings risk and instability, but 
that inaction and “pretending that the volatile Middle East mix of failing regimes, 
rogue states, weapons of mass destruction and terrorism can be contained safely if we 
only let it alone” stands as a far greater danger (Los Angeles Times, 2003). 
This article does not touch the subject of US supremacy, which might be tough 
rhetoric, but is nonetheless only fair to extract from the official statements of its 
global role. The purpose does however seem to be related to stability and peace like 
mentioned before. This is very interesting in that that the goal of unipolarity and 
hegemony differ from the reason of intervention, which is here presented to be of 
more noble intentions.  
Gary Schmitt claims that ignoring the fact that Hussein might be producing, or 
already was in possession of WMD was of far greater threat to the world than an 
invasion of Iraq. His argument is that the only way to uphold peace in the global arena, 
is for the US to act unilaterally e.g. by the means of military intervention if they deem 
it necessary.  
Chomsky is not of this opinion and would most definitely argue otherwise. He holds 
up a mirror to the US government, for them to reflect on their past actions, which 
Chomsky states are more than questionable. Chomsky speaks of the long history of 
the US’ unilateral foreign policy; their exercise of power over Middle Eastern 
countries, such as Iraq, and more or less states that this is the main cause of the 
proliferation of WMD, terrorism and hatred towards the US.  
As mentioned in the theoretical chapter, Chomsky addresses the specific case of Iraq 
and writes a long list of concerns having to do with the hypothetical risks of invading 
Iraq. The long list of concerns and anti-war arguments were as mentioned constituted 
by CIA director George Tenet; the FBI; the leading military-intelligence journal and 
allied intelligence journal; Homeland Security; International relations scholars and so 
on. Their concerns mostly addressed the possibility that a US invasion of Iraq would 
worsen the feared situation of WMD and terrorist proliferation. This risk was 
considered very likely.  
The concerns did vary to some degree. Different factors of risks were stated. One of 
them was, that the likelihood of Hussein initiating a terrorist operation with chemical, 
biological or other unconventional weapons was very little, unless they were attacked 
by the US. A second concern was that a US attack would intensify terrorism, in that it 
would stimulate and globalize anti-American and anti-Western sentiment.  
These concerns predicted the hypothetical situation creating more enemies and 
sparking a quest for revenge among the Middle Eastern countries subjected to the 
US’s exercise of military power. The weak and disaffected people of Iraq would lash 
out at America as a symbol of their suffering.  
“It was also anticipated that an attack on Iraq might stimulate proliferation in more 
direct ways. Terrorism specialist Daniel Benjamin (no dove) observed that an 
invasion might cause "the greatest proliferation disaster in history." Saddam Hussein 
had proven himself to be a brutal tyrant, but a rational one. If he had chemical and 
biological weapons, they were kept under tight control and "subjected to a proper 
chain of command."  (N. Chomsky, 2003, p.123). 
Put more directly Chomsky argues from the Worlds in Collision by Kenneth Waltz 
“American policies stimulate the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons and 
promote their spreading from one country to another. The same policies stimulate 
terrorism” (N. Chomsky, 2003, p. 123). 
 
With so differing opinions on how the possible threat of weapons of mass destruction 
should be handled, it brings up the question of how the US should exercise its power 
and with what (publicly stated) intent. From the PNAC’s perspective it is obviously 
with the intention of peace and preventing a threat of WMD. The purpose of 
promoting peace can also be linked to the Imperial Grand Strategy in that weapons of 
mass destruction can be interpreted as a challenge to the US power – on a military 
level that is. A more thorough definition of “threat” is needed in order to clarify if the 
possession or production of WMD is a threat to another civilization. Nonetheless it is 
by PNAC interpreted as a stability threat for the world and Iraq’s people.  
Noam Chomsky is very critical of the anti-proliferation of WMD as a purpose. He 
states that “the administration was surely aware, even without warnings from 
respected authorities, that its planned war against Iraq and other related actions were 
likely to increase the risks of proliferation of WMD and terror against the US and its 
allies. But evidently it assigns low priority to such threats compared with other goals” 
(N. Chomsky, 2003, p. 124). All the mentioned risks, as Chomsky explains in his sub-
chapter “Insignificant Risks”, were according to him considered insignificant 
compared to the US governments other goal of maintaining their position as global 
hegemon. The phrase “other goals” is very important to gain an insight in what other 
possible goals than just peace the US could have had, and is furthermore followed up 
by Chomsky’s sympathy for senior Middle East correspondent and analyst Youssef 
Ibrahim. Chomsky does make it clear that it is oversimplified but does to some point 
agree that the Iraq invasion was "bolstering the president's popularity" for short-term 
political gain and "turning a 'friendly' Iraq into a private American oil pumping 
station." (N. Chomsky, 2003, p. 125). If the goal of political gain hold, then the public 
purpose of peace and democracy, along with the anti-proliferation of WMD can be 
argued to be if not the most, at least one of the most preferable official statements a 
government could make in order to gain the political discourse. Though, according to 
Chomsky, if the US had had any urgent interest in Iraq, it wouldn’t necessarily need a 
false purpose or goal. “From a propaganda point of view, the most powerful state in 
history needs no justification or serious argument for its actions: declaration of noble 
intent should suffice.” (N. Chomsky, 2003, p. 124). Chomsky’s statement can very 
shortly be summed up by the phrase: “the road to evil is paved by good and noble 
intentions.” 
A Counter-argument to criticism of the invasion has its root in the future and, is 
without a doubt, a crystal-clear definition of preventive war. It is nonetheless an 
argument that respects the National Security Strategy and PNAC’s founding 
statement of principles in that it takes both peace and the maintenance of hegemony 
into account. PNAC uses the remarks by President Clinton at the Pentagon, February 
17, 1998: “What if he (here referring to Saddam Hussein) fails to comply and we fail 
to act […], which gives him yet more opportunities to develop this program of 
weapons of mass destruction and continue to press for the release of the sanctions and 
continue to ignore the solemn commitments that he made? Well, he will conclude that 
the international community has lost its will. He will then conclude that he can go 
right on and do more to rebuild an arsenal of devastating destruction. And some day, 
some way, I guarantee you he’ll use the arsenal.” This argument is furthermore 
followed up by PNAC when it is claimed directly that “Saddam Hussein has produced 
weapons of mass destruction […] For the risks that the leaders of a rogue state will 
use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons against us or our allies is the greatest 
security threat we face”  (Project for the New American Century, 2005, p.8). 
Now, when analyzing the concept of preemptive/preventive war along with what was 
officially stated concerning goals and purposes and what could possibly lie behind it 
is then important to ask:  “Did the administration claim the Iraqi threat was imminent, 
in the sense that Iraq possessed weapons that were about to be used against the United 
States?” PNAC stresses several times that it is important that if “saying that action is 
urgent, [it] is not the same thing as saying the threat is imminent” (Project for the 
New American Century, 2005, p. 104). It is in fact claimed that the president did not 
say that the threat was imminent, but rather that action was urgent in order to prevent 
the threat becoming imminent. In other words by Senate Democratic leader Tom 
Daschle, also used by PNAC in this connection: "The threat posed by Saddam 
Hussein may not be imminent, but it is real, it is growing and it cannot be ignored." 
(Project for the New American Century, 2005, p. iii). There is clearly a very sharp 
line between the concepts of “urgent” and “imminent” for PNAC – That action is 
urgent – the threat is not. It is in that connection only a logical doubt to question the 
logical dilemma of whether or not this is an act of prevention. It is honestly admitted 
by PNAC that it is easy to prove that the threat from Iraq was not imminent, or likely 
to happen at any time, at least not for the time being. It is even mentioned in 
connection to the main critics of the war that “After all, it was argued, the likeliest 
scenario for Saddam actually using the weapons he had was in the event of an 
American invasion” and that “the fact that he had the weapons, some argued, was all 
the more reason why the United States should not go to war” (Project for the New 
American Century, 2005, p. 89). PNAC acknowledges the fact the threat of WMD 
(whether they existed or not) was not imminent and does not counter-argue the anti-
war argument that the weapons would most likely only be use in the event of an US 
invasion. It is now interesting to hold this against a statement stated very early our 
material from PNAC which clearly claims that “the risks that the leaders of a rogue 
state will use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons against us or our allies is the 
greatest security threat we face” (Project for the New American Century, 2005, p. 8). 
Indeed, the use of WMD is obviously a security threat, it is to any country, but it is 
barely argued anywhere that it was a threat any close to becoming a reality. It should 
though be mentioned that PNAC has acknowledged this. They claim that the very 
debate over “imminence” is an “ex post facto attempt to relitigate the old argument 
over the war. The non-discovery of weapons stockpiles has not changed the contours 
of that debate.” (The National Security PNAC’s founding statement of principles of 
1997-2005). 
6.4 The aftermath of 9/11: 
 
The development in domestic and foreign policy in the aftermath of 9/11: 
In the aftermath of 9/11 and the time, leading to the invasion of Iraq there was a major 
domestic debate within the United States about Saddam Hussein’s and Iraq’s potential 
involvement in the 9/11 attacks. There were never any evidence that interconnected 
Saddam Hussein with Al-Qaeda, but a swirling rumor about Iraq’s involvement did 
nonetheless emerge.  
The politicians played a huge role in the growing perception, that Saddam Hussein 
was involved. Thomas Kean from the 9/11 commission stated; 
“There was no question in our minds that there was a relationship between Iraq and 
Al Qaeda”. (Project for the New American Century, 2005, p. 70). 
The US intelligence had no evidence to confirm direct operational collaboration 
between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda, but the report of the Senate Intelligence 
Committee on intelligence and a report of the 9/11 commission have repeatedly 
pointed out contact between them throughout the 1990s.  
The reports state that there has been cooperation between Iraq and Al Qaeda and 
questions the circumstances under which these connections have been made. Several 
meetings has reportedly taken place between the two forces, Iraq intelligence has been 
meeting with Taliban and vice versa. Terrorist has according to US intelligence also 
been allowed refuge in Iraq multiple times.  
 There was never an official statement from the Bush administration that indicated a 
direct Iraqi responsibility in relation to the 9/11 attacks, but they spoke of the alleged 
connection between the two. The administration spoke of possible weapon training by 
Iraqis of Al Qaeda members, Iraq’s history of involvement with terrorists and terrorist 
organizations etc. but they never claimed that Iraq had operational ties in Al Qaeda 
(Project for the New American Century, 2005, p. 73). 
 
The Bush administration argued that Iraq’s ties to terrorism in the past, the contact to 
Al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein and Osama Bin Laden’s mutual desire to harm the 
United States and its allies was a dangerous and yet possible scenario that had to be 
taken seriously. President Bush argued in his State of the Union address in 2003;  
“Before September 11th, many in the world believed that Saddam Hussein could be 
contained. But chemical agents, lethal viruses and shadowy terrorist networks are not 
easily contained. Imagine those 19 hijackers with other weapons and other plans – 
this time armed by Saddam Hussein” (Project for the New American Century, 2005, 
p. 73). 
Dick Cheney the erstwhile vice president has been the most impetuous member of the 
Bush administration in the case of enabling a connection between Iraq and the attacks 
on 9/11, without ever directly blaming them.  
Dick Cheney was in some cases adding fuel to the fire of Iraq involvement. When he 
was asked if he was surprised that 69% percent of the American people believed 
Saddam Hussein was involved in the 9/11 attacks, on September the 14th 2003 in a 
meet the press interview he replied;  
“No I think it’s not surprising that people make that connection” (Project for the New 
American Century, 2005, p. 74). 
Another argument for the intervention was the ‘scientifically verified’ cooperation 
between Iraq and Al Qaeda in the area of chemical and biological weapons. 
According to a report issued by the CIA in September 2002, there was definite 
cooperation:  
“the general pattern that emerges is of Al Qaeda’s enduring interests in acquiring 
chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) expertise from Iraq” (Project 
for the New American Century, 2005, p. 76).   
Even though one might question the validity of this research, there were multiple 
reports of varying reliability that mentions the involvement of Iraq nationals in Al 
Qaeda’s efforts to obtain weapons and weapon training.  
As mentioned earlier Hussein and Bin Laden shared a common enemy in the form of 
United States. Even though the two parties had contrasting religious beliefs 
respectively, Baathist regime (Hussein) and radical Islamic terrorist organization (Bin 
Laden), they both illustrated a great amount of tactical flexibility with former 
collaborators. They would both be capable of overriding any discrepancy that might 
occur between them, if it served a greater tactical purpose like e.g. fighting the United 
States (Project for the New American Century, 2005, p. 92).  
The acknowledgement of this possible scenario among other portraits of Saddam 
Hussein and his possible relation to Al Qaeda, created a certain amount of hostility 
towards Saddam Hussein and Iraq, among the American population, and when the 
Washington Post performed a questionnaire whether or not they considered Saddam 
Hussein as being a responsible accomplice in the 9/11 attacks, 69% percent believed 
so. 
 The Bush administration also argued that the intervention would serve a humane and 
morally correct purpose. The act of removing the tyrant dictator Saddam Hussein for 
the sake of the people was a compelling reason, even though critics did not believe it 
to be the reason. Supporters believed the mere act of liberating the Iraqi people from 
Hussein’s totalitarian dictatorship was a sufficient reason (Project for the New 
American Century, 2005, p. 93). 
With this comparison between N. Chomsky’s, and PNAC’s statements on the 
imminence of the threat it brings another very important question to mind. That is, the 
question of how 9/11 affected the decision-making process and how this was used, 
with the current knowledge on the war. The Grand Strategy was established in 2002, 
which asserted the US the right to resort to force to eliminate any perceived challenge 
to US global hegemony. It was a clear message of will and power.  
 
PNAC and government officials is anywhere in our empirical material claiming that 
they did not directly claim that Iraq or Saddam Hussein for that matter, were 
responsible for the 9/11 attack.  As mentioned earlier the administration consistently 
spoke about contacts between Iraq and al Qaeda, but never claimed that Iraq had 
operational ties to al Qaeda (Project for the New American Century, 2005, p. 73). It is 
therefore not hard to understand why the public opinion on the attack was so focused 
on these ties whatsoever. 
 
Chomsky is very critical on the political 9/11 aftermath. The problem of “imminence” 
is not to discussion for Chomsky and that a tie existed for the government between 
Saddam Hussein and 9/11 is also very clear for. He states that “in September, a 
propaganda campaign was launched to depict Saddam Hussein as an imminent threat 
to the United States and to insinuate that he was responsible for the 9/11” (N. 
Chomsky, 2003, p. 3). Resulting from this “they recognized that the 9/11 atrocities 
provided them with an opportunity to pursue long-standing goals with even greater 
intensity” (N. Chomsky, 2003, p. 109). 
It is though not formally declared anywhere by the administration and decision-
makers, but it is unquestionable that it was discussed - Especially with the use of 
Iraq’s previous history and the dispute with the US. When we are talking about the 
term “imminent” it is important to notice how it is used. Noam does not say that the 
administration declared Iraq or Hussein as an imminent threat, but that they were 
surely trying to establish that picture.  
The motive and theoretical decision of a possible domestic political move, is brought 
to attention when Chomsky, makes a link between the congressional elections and the 
public opinion towards 9/11. The Imperial Grand Strategy of 2002 is furthermore 
taken into account and directly put into context with the recent event as he claims that 
a campaign just parallel with midterm congressional elections “was highly successful 
in shifting attitudes”. It shifted the American opinion to this certain case and helped to 
“achieve electoral aims and establish Iraq as a proper test case for the newly 
announced doctrine of resort to force at will” (N. Chomsky, 2003, p. 3). In this 
context, recent polls revealed increasing discontent with the social and economic 
policies of the administration (N. Chomsky, 2003, p. 120). The “war on terror” sure 
was a complete change of the political focus, of course. Chomsky argues that this was 
used as a propaganda campaign to divert mass discontent into nationalism (N. 
Chomsky, 2003, p. 120). 
 
The “campaign”, which Chomsky calls it, but rather should be thought of as the post 
9/11 political and public debate, did result in a very hostile attitude towards the 
middle east. But taken into account, that this is relatively short time after the terror-
attack, it should also be considered that a general fright existed. Not only for 
American Citizens, but also for the Administration. All options were in that time open 
concerning the question; who was responsible for the Attack. And with Iraq’s 
previous conflict with the US, the public opinion can be thought of as a “quick 
judgement”, which the political debate reinforced. This will be more thoroughly 
analyzed subsequently by E. Said. 
We can after the research on this; say that it is nowhere directly mentioned that 
Saddam Hussein had operational ties to the 9/11 attack. Chomsky is however highly 
supportive of this idea, but does not directly say that it was formally declared. Rather 
“hinted” or brought to attention by “propaganda assault campaigns.” He says that the 
administration and supporters of the war was “hinting broadly that he was involved in 
the 9/11 attacks.” He mentions the supposedly same statistics that Vice President 
Cheney was presented which “regard Saddam Hussein as "an immediate threat to the 
US" who must be removed quickly in self-defense.” (N. Chomsky, 2003, p. 18).  
By March, almost half of Americans believed that Saddam Hussein was personally 
involved in the 9-11 (N. Chomsky, 2003, p. 18). Support for the war was strongly 
correlated with these beliefs (N. Chomsky, 2003, p. 18).  
For a governmental administration it is without a doubt important that the choices it 
makes is accepted or welcomed by the public. Without saying that the government 
proclaimed false warnings, the 9/11 attack was nonetheless a fear inducing moment of 
time for Americans. Chomsky, as a possible reason for the public shifting attitudes, 
aside from government propaganda, which mention; “These may simply be the 
reactions of people who are subject to fear” (N. Chomsky, 2003, p. 19). It is hereafter 
explained with propaganda. We can though not conclude the political debate as 
propaganda as Chomsky does, but use this a reinforcement of the idea that public 
opinion can be affected by fear. It was widely argued that the 9/11 attack “changed 
everything dramatically as the world entered a new and frightening age of terror” (N. 
Chomsky, 2002, p. 188). 
 
The 9/11 attack can be seen, as it is seen by many, as a takeoff of the use of the 
Imperial Grand Strategy and the realization that the imminent threat was now urgent. 
A great deal of action was taken after the attack and the political debate escalated. 
Chomsky argues against the actions and especially against the resulting Imperial 
Grand Strategy claiming “The world did not suddenly become extraordinarily 
dangerous on 9/11, requiring "new paradigms" that dismantle international law and 
institutions and grant the White House the power to disregard the domestic rule of 
law”(N. Chomsky, 2003, p. 91).          
 
 
6.5 American exceptionalism, anti-Americanism, terrorism and 
hypocrisy 
     
It seems that a combination between the American exceptionalist stance the US 
government takes and the fear of terrorists, enemy rogue states with a focus on the 
Middle East has had a connected affect on both the American populaces perception 
and government decisions regarding Iraq. Whether or not the fear was deliberately 
fabricated by the US government or not, the fear played a huge role. The way a word 
and phenomena such as terrorism, Islamic extremism and the Middle East was 
presented definitely affected the US decision-making. As mentioned there was a 
dreaded suspicion amongst the American people, that Saddam Hussein may have 
been cooperating with terrorists such as Al-Qaida. The feared scenario was that 
Hussein would give his, at that time, hypothetical WMD to terrorists for their use.  
PNAC and Chomsky both argue that there was a reason for fear, but differ in opinion 
when it comes to why. Why should the US citizens and government fear terrorists and 
rogue states? Why do the do terrorist organizations and countries such as Iraq hate 
America, it was asked at President Bush's address to a joint session of Congress and 
the nation in 2001. Presidents Bush answer was the following: 
“They hate what they see right here in this chamber: a democratically elected 
government. Their leaders are self-appointed. They hate our freedoms: our freedom 
of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree 
with each other. 
They want to overthrow existing governments in many Muslim countries such as 
Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan. They want to drive Israel out of the Middle East. 
They want to drive Christians and Jews out of vast regions of Asia and Africa. 
These terrorists kill not merely to end lives, but to disrupt and end a way of life. With 
every atrocity, they hope that America grows fearful, retreating from the world and 
forsaking our friends. They stand against us because we stand in their way.”(The 
Washington Post, 2001).  
This statement implicates that the hatred for the US, was simply out of contempt for 
the American culture and values and its general populace. The Arab and Islamic 
world simply hates America for everything that is considered, by the general 
American citizen, as good and virtuous. 
The US’s history of US foreign policy and exercise of power over the Middle Eastern 
country was not mentioned. Chomsky is very keen on pointing out the questionable 
aspects of its history and also addresses the semantics and technicalities of the US’ 
historical practice of foreign policy.  
Lets just take a quick re-evaluation of Robert Kagans “High Moon” metaphor. He 
might be right in saying, that if a towns or global society’s law enforcement makes 
enemies because of its virtuous effort to uphold justice, it would be hypocritical of the 
people to want them leave because of this. With that said, it raises some questions. 
First, have the “global police” better known as the United States of America, actually 
pursued a virtuous effort to uphold justice in the global arena? What is justice, and 
could this effort be perceived differently, depending on what country you live in, and 
furthermore your culture and value system? What exactly has stimulated a hatred for 
the US, also known as anti-Americanism, among the Middle Eastern people causing 
terrorist movements and the like?  
 
Of course there are indeed many perspectives and opinions on the matter. It seems 
that the US government has always taken the virtuous position of the country whom 
opposes any injustice in the world; Injustice such as tyrannical rule.  
 
Chomsky argues against this proclaimed position of the US government and mentions 
a long list of dictators and tyrants, the US had supported in the past, just until they no 
longer served them any purpose Saddam Hussein, was apparently one of them.  
 
Chomsky also argues, that the question asked by George W. Bush: “why do they hate 
us?” was wrongly put. He says that rather than “us” it is a hatred for the policies of 
the government, which Chomsky notes, is much different (N. Chomsky, 2003, p. 214). 
In 1985, president Eisenhower and his administration discussed what they called the 
“campaign of hatred against us” in the Arab world, “not by the governments but by 
the people.” (N. Chomsky, 2003, p. 214). National Security Council advised that the 
basic reason for hatred in the Islam and Arab world, was because of their perception 
that the Us supports corrupt and brutal governments and is “opposing political or 
economic progress” in order “to protect its interest in Near East oil.” (N. Chomsky, 
2003, p. 214). 
Chomsky mentions some research done by the Wall Street Journal on opinions and 
attitudes of westernized “Money Muslims” after 9/11: bankers, professionals, 
managers of multinationals, and so on. They apparently supported the US policies in 
general, but “are bitter about US support for corrupt and repressive regimes that 
undermine democracy and development, and the more specific and recent issues 
concerning Israel-Palestine and Iraq sanctions.” (N. Chomsky, 2003, p. 214). 
Chomsky wants to point out the hypocrisy of the US foreign policy. He, like Robert 
Kagan, also makes a metaphorical comparison to the phenomena, but he does not 
compare the US with the Marshall from “High Moon”. Instead of portraying the US 
government as a “hand of justice”, he actually goes as far as to call them terrorists.  
 
So, Robert Kagan compares the US’s role, the dangerous “rogue states” (Iraq), and 
terrorism in the global arena to the scenario in “High Moon”. The US government 
acts as the Marshall in the global arena and the rogue states and terrorists act as the 
thieves and criminals.  
 
In the theoretical chapter, we mentioned that Chomsky was critical towards the fact 
that, when the re-declaration of “the war on terror” was made, nobody raised the 
question as to what constituted terrorism and much less what caused it. 
Chomsky takes use of another analogy, which he uses to explain the US’s position 
against that, of e.g. terrorists and other enemies of the US.  
He uses a story told by St. Augustine. The story is about a pirate, whom was captured 
by Alexander the Great. Alexander the great asks the pirate: “how he dares molest the 
sea?” "How dare you molest the whole world?" the pirate replies: "Because I do it 
with a little ship only, I am called a thief; you, doing it with a great navy, are called an 
Emperor." (N. Chomsky, 2003, p. 2).  
 
Chomsky comments on the story and says: “It captures with some accuracy the 
current relations between the United States and various minor actors on the stage of 
international terrorism.” Chomsky assimilates the roles of “minor actors in actors on 
the stage of terrorism.” Though Iraq may not have fit this role exactly, we still feel 
that the analogy is appropriate for our use. The writers from PNAC certainly 
portrayed Iraq and Saddam as having connections to terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda, 
which became the popular conception amongst the American people. Apart form that 
– Chomsky himself uses the analogy to explain the US invasion of Iraq in an 
interview with BBC. (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j_DPDY4PKqs).  
 
What Chomsky is trying to point out in his book Pirates and Emperors, Old and New - 
is a double standard. Chomsky proposes that what the US government defines as 
terrorism simply reflects what the US government utilizes as Warfare in the large.  
 
Chomsky provides the definition of terrorism: Extricating ourselves from such 
practices, we use the term "terrorism" to refer to the threat or use of violence to 
intimidate or coerce (generally for political, religious, or other such ends), whether it 
is the terrorism of the emperor or of the thief. This is something that the US 
government and generally what most of the American/Western citizens tend to 
neglect.  
 
The definition of what constitutes “terrorism” and how it differed from aggression 
and resistance, according to Chomsky, became whatever the US government deemed 
it to be: “A convenient definition was adopted: terrorism is what our leaders declare it 
to be. Period. The practice continues as the war is re-declared.” (N. Chomsky, 2003, 
p.109-110).  
 
So the US government’s American exceptionalist stance, the representation of the 
Arab and Islamic world, terrorism, and the Iraq case made by government officials 
and think tanks such as PNAC stimulated a great deal of fear, which seemingly was a 
driving force entailing a war on Iraq.  
We know in retrospect, that the US failed to find WMD’s and any précised and 
proved connection between Saddam Hussein and terrorist organizations such as Al-
Qaida, but we are respecting the case in respect to the perspective in the time before 
and under the Iraq war.  
Whether it’s ideas like American exceptionalism or the fear inducing perception of 
dangerous enemies and threats far away in foreign lands, we have observed form our 
projects research that ideas and the objectified representation of a certain case can 
have incredible power an authority. 
 
6.6 “Hegemony or Survival” and “PNAC” in an orientalist 
perspective: 
 
Introduction to the analytical “orientalist perspective”: 
 
We have analyzed and compared the two theories of the Iraq War. The purpose has 
been to work inductively with these theories to generate our own. For the record, it is 
important to mention, that we do not intend to generate the “true” or “objective” 
theory of why the US chose to invade Iraq. This would be far too ambitious, and 
frankly it would be an arrogant gesture. 
 
It was a trap we were previously falling into before realizing its ignorance. This “trap” 
or to be more precise, the claim of a fabricating an objective and/or true theory of 
things, is exactly what we are trying to uncover in this analysis. 
 
All we could do was find patterns and contradictions between the two theories and 
attempt to describe what they suggest. We have observed that the two theories largely 
differ in a great deal of bias. 
 
Our epistemological and ontological choice is of a post-structuralist constructivist 
stance, and we are therefore commited to reject the notion of a “true” theory, at least 
in a metaphysical sense.  
 
It is now time to put upon us self the “orientalist lens”. We shall use the key 
theoretical concepts, which we have extracted from Said’s theory to try and shed light 
upon the two “objectifying theories” and show their limitations. 
We think that the connection between Said’s theory of Orientalism and Chomsky’s 
theory in Hegemony or Survival will really come to light in the following chapter and 
manifest neatly as a post-structuralist constructivists grounded analysis 
Said and Chomsky both put a large emphasis and speak a great deal about the role of 
intellectuals and scholars in fabricating and manipulating with information, 
knowledge and theories to furthermore generate certain “objective truths” and 
“realities.” Of course in respect to our case their focus groups, in respect to this 
phenomena, have been of the intellectuals and scholars within the fields of 
international relations, foreign policy, Middle Eastern or Orientalist foci and the PR 
industry. Said and Chomsky attempt to debunk the manipulation of information and 
knowledge to further reveal that the US foreign policy is, according to them, 
imperialism and colonialism.  
 
From what we have observed, the Bush administrations and its neoconservative think 
tank, PNAC, never mentions the PR industry and its function, nor do they speak of 
intellectuals’ and scholars’ “methods of manipulating knowledge and information to 
further objectify e.g. the “Orient”. Despite this, we have certainly spotted statements, 
theoretical principles and rhetoric characteristic of what Said an Chomsky criticize.  
Chosmky and Said both have a Poststructuralist constructionist way of looking at how 
and why human phenomena and ideas of reality and truths come to be, herein with 
focus on its application within international relations. They attempt to debunk the 
rhetoric and manipulation of information and knowledge to reveal that US foreign 
policy is no different from imperialism and colonialism.  
 
 
Political and cultural global hegemony: 
 
We will start by addressing an explaining the US’s role within the context of one 
Antonio Gramsci’s theory of hegemony as a pretext to the “orientalist lens”. With the 
theoretical concept of cultural hegemony as it is explained in the theoretical chapter, 
we state the following:  
 
The US stands as a cultural hegemon on a global scale. Furthermore the US and its 
social norms have established social structures (social and economic classes), which 
the ruling class establish and exert their cultural dominance to impose their “world 
view”. This “world view” justifies the social, political, and economic status quo as 
natural, inevitable, and beneficial to every social class, rather that as artificial social 
constructs beneficial solely to the ruling class (Chernow, Barbara A.; Vallasi, George 
A., eds. 1994; Bullock, Alan; Trombley, Stephen, eds. 1999; 
Holsti, K. J. 1985).  
 
This phenomena, originally used to explain hegemonic rule in one society can be said 
to have globalized, in that the US stand as the global hegemon and stands as the ruling 
class and advocate, enforcer of the dominant ideology, furthermore entailing their 
“world view” in the global arena. The dominant ideology isthe US is a liberalistic; 
democratic; free market capitalism.  
 
This pretext serves as an explanation of the mechanisms, roots, influences and forces 
in a society, which generate certain prevailing and objectified realities. This 
theoretical concept explains that the US’s dominant and exceptionalist self-regard and 
working approach is merely a result of its societies’ dominant class’ interests, and not 
necessarily prevalent, because it is the optimal, objective and true ideology of virtue 
and justice, beneficial to the globes general populace.  
 
Now, as we have mentioned in the theoretical section, Chomsky compares and 
explains the resemblance of the rhetoric and conduct of foreign policy between 
Reagan’s and George W. Bush’s administration. Chomsky’s comment on the Bush 
administrations policies, domestic and abroad, has very clear parallels to Said’s 
theories, which among others, is inspired by Gramsci’s theories:  
“Though the Bush planners are at an extreme end of the traditional US policy 
spectrum, their programs and doctrines have many precursors, both in US history and 
among earlier aspirants to global power. More ominously, their decisions may not be 
irrational within the framework of prevailing ideology and the institutions that 
embody it.” (Chomsky 2003. p. 4) 
 
Here Chomsky obviously states that the US foreign policy and approach to the global 
arena is related to the America ideological system and structure. 
 
In an article in The Guardian, written by Said Edward Said, he highlights the 
important aspects of his book Orientalism, focused on its relevance, contemporary to 
2003 and the Iraq situation. Said’s comment to the situation was , that there hade 
been: 
 
“(…) so massively and calculatedly, aggressive an attack on the contemporary 
societies of the Arab and Muslim world for their “backwardness”, lack of democracy 
and abrogation of women’s rights, that we simply forget, in the process, that such 
notions as modernity, enlightenment, and democracy, by no means are simple and 
agreed-upon concepts, that one either does or does not find like Easter eggs in the 
living room.” (Edward Said, 2003, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2003/aug/02/alqaida.highereducation) 
 
The publicists of that time, who had spoken in the name of foreign policy “have 
fabricated an arid landscape ready for the Americans power to construct there an 
ersatz model of free market “democracy.””(Edward Said, 2003, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2003/aug/02/alqaida.highereducation) 
 
Said continues and states that the Iraq War has been one of the “intellectual 
catastrophes of history”, in that: 
 
“an imperialist war confected by a small group of unelected US officials was waged 
against a devastated third world dictatorship on thoroughly ideological grounds 
having to do with world dominance, security control and scarce resources, but 
disguised for its true intent, hastened and reasoned for by orientalists who betrayed 
their calling as scholars.” (Edward Said, 2003, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2003/aug/02/alqaida.highereducation) 
 
Chomsky certainly doesn’t disagree with this notion. Apart from global dominance, 
security control and scarce resources Chomsky also explains that the war also was to 
ensure domestic political goals.  
 
As Edward Said said, the war was hastened and reasoned for by by orientalists. These 
orientalists were experts of the Arab and Islamic world. People such as Bernard Lewis 
and Fuad Ajami. According to Said they had a major influence on Bush’s pentagon 
and national security council. They also helped the “American hawks” to think out 
phenomena such as the Arab mind and the “centuries old Islamic decline which only 
American power could reverse. Said continues:  
 
“Today Bookstores in the us are filled with books bearing screaming headlines of 
Islam and terror, like Islam exposed, the Arab threat and the Muslim menace To stir 
up America against the foreign devil.” (Edward Said, 2003, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2003/aug/02/alqaida.highereducation). 
 
Lets get back to Chomsky’s assertion that the Iraq War and the portrayal of terrorists, 
largely affiliated with the Orients, was used for domestic and international political 
gain. Chomsky also writes of how and why the “stir up of the foreign devil” was used 
to induce fear among the American populace.  
 
He writes that the Reagan administration like the bush administration exploited the 
campaign against terrorism for domestic and international political and economic 
purposes. Chomsky addresses the political method of subjugating fear to ensure an 
obedient and supportive populace. The policies can’t be presented as they are 
intended he says, they can only be implement “if the general population is properly 
frightened by the monsters against whom we must defend ourselves.” (Chomsky 2003, 
Pirates and Emperors, Old and New, p. 3). 
The fabrication of a foreign “Boogie Man” has always been useful to those in power. 
With the portrayal of an enemy comes the advantage and possibility for the US to 
position them selves against the Boogie Man as the “good guy”.  
Chomsky says that the intellectuals and scholars within the field of international 
relations have always taken the position of being “conformist subservience to those in 
power” and that this has been their regular stance throughout history. They have 
always represented those in power as good and virtuous, and as Said puts it “hastened 
and reasoned” for them whilst disguising their true intent with noble intentions. 
(Chomsky 2003. p. 48-49). Chomsky adds:  
“But it is important to recognize that profession of noble intent is predictable, and 
therefore carries no information, even in the technical sense of the term. (Chomsky 
2003. p. 48-49) 
 
Chomsky says that even the harshest and most shameful measures through out 
imperialist and colonialist history have regularly been accompanied by noble intent. 
He then generalizes by quoting Thomas Jefferson on his observation of the world 
situation in his day, which can be compared to the Iraq War:  
“We believe no more in Bonaparte's fighting merely for the liberties of the seas, than 
in Great Britain's fighting for the liberties of mankind. The object is the same, to draw 
to themselves the power, the wealth, and the resources of other nations.” (Chomsky 
2003. p. 48-49). 
 
How does the concepts of knowledge and power enhance Said’s analysis of the 
Orient, and how does these concepts shed light the decision to intervene in Iraq?  
 
 In Said’s work ‘The world, the Text, and the Critic’, he states thus: 
“Criticism must think of itself as life-enhancing and constitutively opposed to every 
form of tyranny, domination, and abuse; its social goals are non-coercive knowledge 
produced in the interests of human freedom”(E. San Juan, Jr., 2009, section 3)   
http://philcsc.wordpress.com/2009/01/22/postcolonial-dialogics-edward-said-versus-
antonio-gramsci/  
This is a motto by Said that indicates how he viewed politics and social/cultural on a 
global scale.  
The purpose of this section is thus, to present how his analysis of power and 
knowledge as a tool are interconnected with modern imperialism and cultural 
hegemony.      
Said elaborates hugely on the relationship between power and knowledge in his book 
Orientalism. This theme is a persistent and recurring concept throughout the book, 
and one of the main areas of investigation. Said presents a picture on how the power 
distribution emerged historically between the East and the West and engages in an 
investigation of what factors may have influenced this power relation. Said explains 
how the concept of knowledge is deeply connected to the concept of power, and 
elaborates on these two themes consistently throughout his analysis.  
Based on documents, journals, books etc. written in the 1800’s, Orientalism became 
something to discuss and analyze in the common academic institution, which 
allowed/allows itself to;  
“Talk about the Orient, authorizing views of it, explain it, teach it, colonize it, reign 
over it; in short, orientalism as a western way to dominate, restructure and gain 
power over the Orient” 
(E. Said, 1994, p. 13) Free translation)  
Said makes extensive use of historian Bernard Lewis view on the Arab civilization. 
Lewis has throughout all his works been speaking degrading about Muslims and 
Islam. Among other arguments, he states that Muslims will never know the ‘truth’, 
because they are to embedded in their religion. Furthermore, he states; 
“Muslims and Arabs lacks the ability of being objective, while orientalists such as 
Lewis is objective per definition due to a well-educated background, as well as the 
fact that they wear a ‘Western spectacles’ when they speak of Muslims and Arabs.” 
(E. Said, 1994, p. 347 Free translation)    
This process of labelling and objectification of the ‘unknown’ is what Said’s analysis 
of power and knowledge consists of. He highlights several orientalists view on the 
Orient and exhibits how they validate their theories as objective truths.    
In relation to his process of investigating the relationship between power and 
knowledge and its influence on the relation between the East and the West, Said 
mentions Michel Foucault as a major inspiration. Michel Foucault presents a specific 
conception on the system of thought in his works ‘The Archaeology of Knowledge’ 
and ‘Discipline of Punish’, which became of great use for Said in the case of 
identifying orientalism (E. Said, 1994, p.13). 
Said argues with knowledge from Foucault’s work in ‘Archaeology of Knowledge’ 
that there is a clear discourse about the Orient as something being somewhat less that 
is prominent among orientalists.  
Michel Foucault suggests that instead of accepting those discursive unities, which are 
sacrificed by the power of traditions, a scholar should challenge them:  
“I shall accept the groupings that history suggests only to subject them at once to 
interrogation; to break them up and then to see whether they can be legitimately 
reformed; or whether other groupings should be made; to replace them in a more 
general space which, while dissipating their apparent familiarity, makes it possible to 
construct a theory of them”( Michel Foucault, 2012) http://somereading.blogspot.dk/2012/03/michel‐foucault‐archaeology‐of.html 
Discourse describes the limits of speech and the limits of possible truth. In e.g. social 
science, there is no such thing as truth, and by analyzing our empirical material, we 
aim to exhibit how objectifications considered as scientific truth can have limitations. 
The effect of discourse over the Orient can have certain impacts on e.g. foreign 
policy.  
Said claims that the discourse about the Orient and its contents are based on the 
‘knowledge’ expressed by orientalists such as Bernard Lewis that supported a 
historically non-verifiable perception of the Orient among Westerners (E. Said, 1994, 
p.13). Said extracts Foucault’s idea about discourse and the fact that objective values 
cannot exist.  
In Project for the New American Century, the Bush administration argues that an 
intervention in Iraq would serve a humane and morally correct purpose. As mentioned 
earlier in the assignment, they proclaimed that the act of removing a totalitarian 
dictatorship for the sake of the people was a compelling and morally correct reason.  
This argument for intervention fully cooperate with the discourse about Arab 
countries being less developed and in desperate need for help. As Said explains 
Western values aren’t necessarily universal values, and according to him  
Foucault’s theory of discourse they might not want to adopt these values that are 
oppressed upon them. This is also a perfect example of the forceful entity knowledge 
and power creates. The knowledge of an American superior hegemon who spreads the 
‘right values’ for the ‘right reasons’ which unfolds in powerful domination (Project 
for the New American Century, p. 93).              
 Said argues that without analyzing orientalism as a system of thoughts, it would be 
impossible to comprehend the systematic discipline, that made the European culture 
capable of managing/controlling and present the Orient politically, sociologically, 
ideologically, empirically and imaginary in the period after the Age of Enlightenment 
(E.Said, 1994, p.13).   
Said defines European and American orientalism as the exercise of intellectual power 
over the Orient. The feeling of being superior is according to Said deeply embedded 
in the Western self-consciousness.  
This feeling of being superior Said mentions correlates to an extensive degree with 
what Noam Chomsky refers to as the ‘Imperial Grand Strategy’. The strategy that we 
mention earlier in this assignment describes the need for the United States to obtain 
and sustain their position as the global hegemon through economic, military and 
political measures. This theory suits Said’s critique of the United States as a modern 
imperialistic country and exhibits his belief about the Western tendency to categorize 
and label the Orient in vague and biased objectifications can lead to war, genocide 
etc. With these two theories collaborating you might end up questioning the 
procedural account of reasoning prior to the Iraq intervention (Noam Chomsky, 2003, 
p.11).  
Said elaborates on the Western tendency to fear the ‘unknown’ – the Orient. In 
Project for the New American Century, there is a coherent notion, that the Bush 
administration at no point had evidence that Saddam Hussein and Iraq possessed 
WMD’s. Nonetheless, the administration stated; 
“Given Iraq’s ties to terrorism in the past, its contacts with Al Qaeda, and Saddam’s 
and Bin Laden’s mutual interest in harming the United States and its allies in the 
region, this was a possibility that had to be taken seriously” 
Chomsky and Said’s theories both entail a skepticism towards actions such as the 
intervention that took place in Iraq. While Chomsky points to the ‘Imperial Grand 
Strategy’ and the efforts by the United States to maintain its status as the only 
superpower in a unipolar system, Said theorizes on how modern American 
imperialism and its efforts to promote Western values such as a liberal free market 
and Western democracy is based on demeaning objectifications that neglects and 
excludes the possibility of free will.    
Another concept Said put emphasis on is authority. Authority has been serving as a 
tool in the proliferation of orientalism it is a persuasive concept, which sets the 
standards for values, norms etc. and encourages truth, traditions, and perceptions from 
an authoritative point of view. These characteristics fits the description of orientalism 
and its content according to Said (E. Said, 1994, p.30).   
Authority in the face of a superior hegemon also correlates with the abovementioned 
Western belief that ‘we’ have acquired the perfect universal values that should be 
shared among other countries. And highlights the Western tendency of a creating 
discourses about Arab communities.    
Said states that orientalism requires external unities, which means that the orientalist 
is e.g. a scientist, that describes the Orient and expresses its mysteries to the West. He 
never considers the Orient as anything else than empirical material that validates his 
investigation. This ability of Western scientist to present and categorize the Orient is 
directly connected to the concept of power. The fact that the Orient even seem 
reasonable has more to do with the West’s presentation of it, than the Orient itself. 
The Orient is reasonable thanks to, Western manufacturing techniques that visualizes 
and clarifies the discourse about it (E. Said, 1994, p.32). 
 
Said’s main objective with Orientalism is to question existing research of the Orient 
and ask; if it is possible to study other cultures and people from a liberal, not 
oppressive and manipulative perspective. It would force scientist to rethink all the 
complex knowledge gathered that revolves around knowledge and power (E. Said, 
1994, p.37).   
The connection between power and knowledge has created the ‘orientalist’. The 
ability of Westerners to label and objectify foreign cultures and countries with certain 
characteristics and consider it to be empirical knowledge is what creates power. 
Huntington’s theory on ‘Clash of Civilizations’ presents the exact same notion of 
objectification that Said is trying to point out as an unfortunate tendency of the West. 
Huntington strengthens Said’s view on the orientalists by stating quite the opposite. 
He divides major areas and cultural entities into civilizations, and assign these 
civilizations with attributes that might not be shared commonly in the population. 
This is a perfect example of an American political scientist of high regard that 
contributes to the American self-consciousness of being a superior hegemon, by 
objectifying e.g. the Arab civilization as troublesome, Huntington enhance Western 
identity and debases the Arab communities culturally, politically etc.  
In relation to our empirical material respectively, Project for the New American 
Century and Hegemony or Survival several traits in Said’s analysis of the relation 
between power and knowledge become relevant. Said and Chomsky share several 
beliefs in connection to the United States ‘promotion of their values, as well as their 
somehow imperialist tendency of challenging the unknown and dangerous.                                  
7. Discussion 
 
With our current knowledge deriving from our analysis of the decision-making and 
the presentation of the Iraq war along with criticism from Chomsky we now wish to 
discuss the found knowledge with focus on how we understand it.  
Did Iraq pose an imminent threat? PNAC is defending the question of imminence. It 
should be clear that in connection to the UN Charter, if a threat was imminent - if 
WMD’s were confirmed and almost on the edge of usage on the US, then with a 
reasonable interpretation of the declaration, it could be considered a threat that should 
be preempted. PNAC stresses that action is urgent, it is not the same thing as saying 
the threat is imminent. Nor did the president claim that the threat was eminent, but 
rather that action was urgent. But with no WMD’s proven, is it then not a preventive 
act to declare war with the intent of preventing WMD’s or the production to build up? 
In the words of PNAC: “The threat posed by Saddam Hussein may not be imminent, 
but it is real, it is growing and it cannot be ignored". PNAC does after all also state 
that it is easy to prove that the threat was not imminent. The threat was now with our 
knowledge not imminent in the sense that it could endanger the US security at any 
given moment. It is again interesting to look at the argument that “the risks that the 
leaders of a rogue state will use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons against us or 
our allies is the greatest security threat we face”. Logically the purpose for invading 
must then have been of preemptive manner in the official words. This should be held 
against Noam Chomsky’s previously mentioned definition of preemptive action with 
the example of ships nearing the US with the clear intend to bomb. This was not the 
case. PNAC is very consistent in mentioning that action was necessary and Chomsky 
consistently claims the opposite. It is therefore hard to withdraw facts from these 
contradicting theories and we can therefore not determine if the threat was imminent 
or not. It is reasonable to interpret Iraq as a threat, at least regarding public opinion, 
which is useful for decision makers with a clear motive for invading, after the 9/11 
attack. This clearly triggered a fear throughout the public, which objectively seen 
could easily be used in connection with focused PR-campaigning and thereby gaining 
support for the war. It is clearly what Chomsky claims. In connection with the poor 
foundation regarding WMD and a threat that was not really imminent, in its own 
definition, it questions the formal and noble intentions and principles declared.  
 
But what are American principles? It is first and foremost democracy and freedom, 
which is mentioned frequently throughout our empirical material as the intention for 
the intervention – to free Iraq from oppression and tyranny. Rhetoric intentional 
placement of words like “evil-doers”, “tyrants”, and “god” were frequently used by 
the Bush administration as for example the phrase: "rid the world of evildoers" (N. 
Chomsky, 2003, p. 109). When comparing the National Security Strategy of 2002 and 
the Project for the New American Century it is very clear that the US in no way 
attempts to hide its intentions of spreading its principles by all means necessary - 
especially if foreign principles is considered a threat. 
The second category is the responsibilities. “The unavoidable reality is that the 
exercise of American power is key to maintaining what peace and order there is in the 
world today.”(Los Angeles Times, 2003). A responsibility is also to act as a “world 
police” which includes removing human rights-violators like Saddam Hussein. These 
are the very principles concerning the use of American power formally stated. It is 
implicitly understood in this that another goal is to maintain this position of 
hegemony. "Our forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from 
pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the 
United States" (N. Chomsky, 2003, p. 11). This motive is on the other hand very 
explicit and nowhere hidden. We can however not claim that there were any hidden 
motives apart from freedom and peace, but the connections and contradictions of our 
analysis does suggest certain inconsistencies in the way the war was presented 
opposed to reality. 
 
The Iraq War is a very complex case. We have done our best to generate our own 
theory perspective from the connections and contradictions of the two empirical 
sources and the theories they suggest.  
 
 
From what we have observed it seems they differ most in biased opinion, as to the 
role of the US; to which extent their government is acting as global police; if it is 
really pursuing its proclaimed path of virtue and justice or if it is actually misusing its 
power brutally and excessively, forcing down upon the Iraqi people based on arbitrary 
beliefs, assumptions and ideological premises.  
 
We have tried our best to remain objective towards both to PNAC’s and Chomsky’s 
theory. The aspects that make it possible for us to work out our own theory on the 
matter inductively, is our choice of epistemology and ontology as well as the 
Orientalist perspective approach we have embraced.  
The point of the project was to look at the theoretical principles, aspects and features 
that became established in the US government and came to underlay the invasion of 
Iraq. We used Chomsky’s empirical presentation and based on it, which was 
demonized and rejected by the US government at the time, to counter it. Subsequently 
we took use of Said’s theory of Orientalism to further counter it. How did we counter 
it exactly? 
While remaining objective towards the two empirical sources and theories, it was our 
epistemology and ontology that generated our commitment to counter the established 
and objectifying theories supporting the invasion. We know that the US government 
and the PNAC. Chomsky and Said both served, as Chomsky’s theory states, that the 
US and its hegemonic and unilateral political conduct in the international scene is the 
vary cause of terrorism, enemy rogue states and the proliferation of WMD. Chomsky 
rather calls the rogue states and terrorist fight against the US resistance than terrorism.  
He points out the US governments tendency neglect the double-standard and 
hypocrisy of their foreign policies as well as their tendency or deliberate attempts to 
and sugarcoat and justify it by noble intent.  
The writers of the PNAC argue that most anti-war arguments with regard to the Iraq 
Case are ignorant and naive. They argue that the choice of going into war was the 
right decision. If the US hadn’t intervened it could have been dramatic.  
We are looking at a case in retrospect. We know that the invasion happened and that 
there weren’t found any WMD’s, which was the “slam dunk” argument for the 
invasion. This is what made this case so controversial. Despite the fact that these 
weapons weren’t found, Robert Kagan and William Kristol argue that the invasion 
was still a legitimate decision, in that the Iraq case always had been a much broader 
predicament than its possibility of possessing WMD.  
So the case in many ways comes down to a bias regarding virtue of US’s position as 
the global hegemon and its foreign policy. This is why we have taken use of Said’s 
theory of Orientalism to attempt to at least shed light on the problem and show the 
limits of an objective theory of what was right and wrong. 
  
8. Conclusion 
 
Our theory is similar to Said and Chomsky’s theories to some extent. The US 
government’s role as the global hegemon, its exceptionalist stance and representation 
of its goals, virtue and noble intent is rather arbitrary and argued for with a 
sugarcoating and objectifying rhetoric. We are also of the belief that the US foreign 
policy reflects the interests of those in power and the elite class of America.  
In the respect to the discussion of whether or not Iraq posed an imminent threat at the 
time also raises some suspicion amongst us. There are clear statements by the Bush 
administrations government officials stating that they were positive that Saddam 
Hussein possessed WMD. This was the “slam dunk” argument for the threats 
imminence and hastened the urgency and necessity of immediate action, being the 
invasion of Iraq in 2003.  
The writers of the PNAC and government officials corrected this statement after the 
subsequent failure to find these weapons. Our theory of this is that Chomsky to some 
extent was right in saying, that the governments reason for pushing the war and 
making the case that it was urgent, had to do with the Bush administrations goal of 
maintaining their position in office.  
We believe that the events of 9/11 did certainly create a public fear. The political 
debate in the following year was very centered around, but not concluding, a 
connection between the 9/11 attack and Iraq. Polls did however show a common 
interpretation that pointed towards these exact ties. It could have been used to 
stimulate the political discourse in favor of the government, which at the time were 
burdened with various issues not related to war, but rather domestic. We can however 
not conclude this, but we can evidently state that the attack did create political 
opportunities for the US government to change and set new standards for foreign 
policy.  
It was though never officially stated that a tie existed, but through PNAC’s account 
for previous incidents like the housing of terrorists and the past terror connections, 
there could possibly have been. 
The 9/11 attack and the huge discussion about terrorism, primarily affiliated with 
Islamic terrorists, combined with it being connected to Iraq, was definitely a driving 
force in the case for an invasion of Iraq. The opportunity of exploiting the unrest and 
fear concerning terrorism was certainly put to use by the Bush-administration when 
presenting and portraying the case. We are relatively positive that the US foreign 
policy with regards to the specific case of Iraq and the Middle East in general was 
hastened and reasoned for by orientalist assumptions and anxieties. 
We do not doubt that maintaining the position as global superpower is of very high 
priority for the US government and that it certainly has acted accordingly. Without 
this said we are uncertain and critical towards the notion that it is all a part of a Grand 
Strategy and scheme of world dominance, but we do not entirely reject it. As 
mentioned our primary limit to generating our own theory, was not being able to 
generate a true theory and uncover all the mysteries of the Iraq War. 
What have been able to uncover with the use of the “orientalist lens”: 
 
The lens grants the historical understanding of the phenomena of the “West” and its 
tendency to exercise power over the “orients”. It has granted us the capability of 
analyzing and explaining the US’s pursuit of spreading its ideology and “world view” 
as objective and true, and the roots and mechanism of this issue.  
We are convinced that the use of Said’s theory at least made it possible for us to 
reveal that the US’s dominant ideology, its projection of its “world view” as an the 
objective and true; inevitable and optimal one, is at least within our epistemology and 
ontology, false.  
Both Said and Chomsky have served as very strong debunkers of such a notion. 
Despite this it’s hard to say whether or not the US government has conspired to gain 
and sustain power in the domestically and in the global arena through deliberate 
manipulation and tinkering with information and knowledge during the prior and 
during the Iraq War, and whether it’s a part of a grand scheme. One has to be careful 
not to get to deep into the conspiracy, but Chomsky shows a thorough amount of 
empirical evidence in regard to political organs of the US government, such as the PR 
industry, confected by people whom have the task of “molding public opinion” and 
“manufacturing consent” to ensure obedience in society. This is a very good example 
of how the ruling class, here speaking within the context of cultural hegemony, can 
fabricate a “world view” and project it upon the domestic and/or global society.  
The knowledge and information written, read, elaborated upon and the result of it is 
related to the individual actors in the discussion subjectivity and interests and the 
discussion is limited to the forums structure and barriers of acceptable language and 
speech.  
What we can say is that a “world view” or an “objective truth” on the matter of right 
and wrong and its connection to the Iraq case and the US governments general 
theoretical principles underlying their role and approach as the global hegemon is 
constructed. Such a construct is a result of the US’s ideological system and structure 
wherein their constructed discourses of truths are limited by the language available to 
them.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9. After Thoughts 
 
When we in retrospect consider our work process and involvement with this specific 
area of research, there is several things we could have done differently and several 
things we are quite satisfied about. It has definitely been a challenge to work 
inductively and creative our own theory. We are nonetheless glad we took the 
challenge, because the learning process that followed from thinking out of the box has 
been major. We acknowledged the fact that there is no objective truth in social 
science, and acquired skills that enable us to work more academically with a given 
subject without naturally accepting others ‘objective truths’. The fact that any theory 
has limitations and should act as tools in order to develop/generate one’s academic 
personal skills, were quite new to us as 2nd semester students. We were to a greater 
extent forced to be critical towards our sources and extract limitations that each of our 
main empirical material serves.  
We could have done several things differently. We choose to adopt an orientalist view 
in our analyzing section, which might have influenced our own theory as a result. 
Said our main analytical source correlates far more with Noam Chomsky whose 
theory represents half of our main empirical material. This relation infringes with the 
ability to be completely objective towards the sources, which off course turned out 
not to be our goal. Instead we choose to counter the established theory for 
intervention with respectively, Said and Noam Chomsky.  
Another thing we could have done differently was to incorporate more theoreticist in 
our analysis of the sources. We include several theorireticist, but do not work 
thoroughly with them as we have done with Said. That might have changed the 
content of our analysis –discussion and conclusion sections.  
This assignment can be connected to and be put into perspective in relation to every 
American intervention in ‘third world countries’. The decision-making process might 
have been conducted on different foundation, but the theoretical aspect of our 
assignment that presents the United States as a hegemon willing to make sacrifices for 
maintaining its dominant role in the unipolar system as superior hegemon of the 
world. Even though the intervention might not be comparable with the American, 
intervention in e.g. Vietnam there would definitely be similarities worth investigating 
and analyzing.                                                                                                  
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